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Abstract
Security is a significant problem for communications in many scenarios in Internet of Things
(IoT), such as military applications, electronic payment, wireless reprogramming of smart
devices and so on. To protect communications, a secret key shared by the communicating
parties is often required. Authenticated key exchange (AKE) is one of the most widely
used methods to provide two or more parties communicating over an open network with
a shared secret key. It has been studied for many years. A large number of protocols are
available by now. The majority of existing AKE protocols require the two communicating
parties execute equivalent computational tasks. However, many communications take place
between two devices with significantly different computational capabilities, such as a cloud
center and a mobile terminal, a gateway and a sensor node, and so on. Most available
AKE protocols do not perfectly match these scenarios.
To further address the security problem in communications between parties with fairly
unbalanced computational capabilities, this thesis studies AKE protocols with unbalanced
computational requirements on the communicating parties. We firstly propose a method
to unbalance computations in the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange
scheme. The resulting scheme is named as UECDH scheme. The method transfers one
scalar multiplication from the computationally limited party to its more powerful commu-
nicating partner. It significantly reduces the computational burden on the limited party
since scalar multiplication is the most time-consuming operation in the ECDH scheme.
When applying the UECDH scheme to design AKE protocols, the biggest challenge
is how to achieve authentication. Without authentication, two attacks (the man-in-the-
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middle attack and the impersonation attack) can be launched to the protocols. To achieve
authentication, we introduce different measures that are suitable for a variety of use cases.
Based on the authentication measures, we propose four suites of UECDH-based AKE pro-
tocols. The security of the protocols is discussed in detail. We also implement prototypes
of these protocols and similar protocols in international standards including IEEE 802.15.6,
Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 and Bluetooth 5.0. Experiments are carried out to
evaluate the performance. The results show that in the same experimental platform, the
proposed protocols are more friendly to the party with limited computational capability,
and have better performance than similar protocols in these international standards.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays, large numbers of devices are equipped with communicating capability and are
connected into the Internet of Thighs (IoT). Communications take place every minute
between various devices in the IoT; and many of them occur between two devices with
fairly different (or “unbalanced”) computational capabilities, such as a smart phone and
a cloud server, a sensor node and a base station, and so on. For these communications,
security is often required since they can carry sensitive information, and authentication
between the communicating devices are generally required. This thesis explores security
solutions for communications in the IoT, and in particular, for communications between
two devices with unbalanced computational capabilities.
1.1 Motivation
The motivation lies in two aspects: (1) the importance of security and (2) available solutions
and their unsuitability for communications between devices with unbalanced computational
capabilities.
1.1.1 Importance of Security
Information security is a vitally important problem in many applications in the IoT [29, 64,
72]. It generally involves two basic objectives: message authenticity (or message integrity)
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and confidentiality [55]. Details about these objectives and their importance in various
IoT applications are introduced as follows.
• Authenticity (or integrity). Message authenticity (or integrity) guarantees a party is
able to identify whether a message it receives was sent by a party claiming to have
sent it, and was not modified in transit. It is the basic objective in many applications.
For example, in a wireless reprogramming scenario, when an IoT device receives an
update service, it should be able to make sure two things: (1) whether the service was
sent by the service provider and (2) whether the update files were modified in transit.
Lacking authenticity, attackers can implant malware into the device. For instance,
Ronen et. al [86] break Philips IoT platform [84] through wireless firmware update;
and Ling et. al illustrate firmware attacks to IoT through installing a malicious
firmware on the smart plug [65].
• Confidentiality. Confidentiality guarantees sensitive information is only known by
those authorized to know it. Many IoT applications, such as e-healthcare and pay-
ment, involve sensitive information that requires confidentiality. Firstly, people would
not use these applications if confidentiality of privacy information is not guaranteed.
Secondly, leakage of privacy information, such as the password of a user’s bank ac-
count, will lead to serious losses. Thirdly, protecting the privacy of users is required
by the law [98], and accords with ethic.
1.1.2 Available Solutions
Authenticated key establishment (AKE) is the underlying approach to security problems.
It establishes shared keys for two or more parties to protect the communications between
them. It has been studied for many years; and many schemes have been proposed. Typical
types of available AKE scheme are introduced as follows.
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Schemes based on symmetric cryptography
AKE schemes based on symmetric cryptography require the communicating parties have
a pre-shared secret with each other (denoted as server-less schemes), or have shared se-
crets with a trusted center (denoted as server-based schemes). The international standard
ISO/IEC 11770 Part 2 [52] specifies six server-less schemes and seven server-based schemes.
A server-less scheme [89, 106, 105] generates a shared session key from the pre-shared secret
between the parties. A server-based scheme [77] relies on a trusted center to distribute a
shared session key for the parties; and a pre-shared secret is used to protect communication
between the party and the trusted center. In both the two types of scheme, a session key
is used to protect subsequent communications in the session.
The advantage of these schemes is that they are lightweight and affordable for compu-
tational limited devices. The limitations include: (1) in some cases it is inconvenient for
devices to deploy and update pre-shared secrets; (2) the pre-shared secret should be stored
in secure memory which is expensive.
Schemes based on asymmetric cryptography
AKE schemes based on asymmetric cryptography [88] require the parties acquire the public
key of each other. The public keys are used to securely transport secret values [14, 76, 66].
The secret values can be directly used as a session key. Alternatively, the two parties can
agree a session key based on the secret value.
The advantage of these schemes is that they do not require any pre-shared secret be-
tween the parties. The limitations include: (1) they often rely on public key infrastructure
(PKI) [50] where there is a certificate authority (CA) issuing public key certificates for
the parties; and maintaining the public key certificates is complicated and expensive; and
(2) asymmetric cryptographic algorithms have high computational requirements and may
overburden the limited devices.
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Table 1.1: Key sizes for equivalent security levels (in bits).
Symmetric algorithm ECC algorithm DH/RSA
80 163 1024
128 283 3072
192 409 7680
256 571 15,360
Schemes based on (elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman key exchange
Diifie-Hellman (DH) key exchange [33] is the basis for a vast range of AKE protocols. Its
elliptic curve version, i.e., elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange, has become
one of the most popular measures to design AKE protocols in IoT [75, 4, 108, 63, 110, 21].
Many international standards and specifications for security or communication, such the
TLS standard, theIEEE standard 802.15.6 and the Bluetooth specification 5.0, include
AKE schemes based on ECDH. In an ECDH-based AKE scheme, the parties generate
secret values, compute public values, exchange the public values, and compute the shared
secret respectively.
The advantage of ECDH-based schemes over asymmetric cryptography-based schemes
is efficiency. Elliptic curve cryptographic (ECC) algorithms provide high security with
relatively shorter keys; and they do not require any pre-shared secret. K. Lauter [61]
compares key length for the same security level provided by ECC, symmetric cryptography
algorithms and other asymmetric cryptographic algorithms such as DH key exchange and
RSA (Table 1.1). As a result, ECDH-based AKE schemes often surpass other AKE schemes
in IoT.
Summary of available schemes
As we presented above, ECDH-based AKE schemes are more suitable for IoT since they do
not require pre-shared secret between the parties; and they are more efficient than other
asymmetric cryptography based schemes. However, available ECDH-based AKE schemes
require the communicating parties execute equivalent computational tasks. Therefore,
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they are not perfectly suitable for communications between two devices with unbalanced
computational capabilities.
1.2 Solution
This thesis aims to design more suitable AKE protocols for communications between two
devices with unbalanced computational capabilities. In particular, we aim to unbalance
computations in the ECDH key exchange scheme and design AKE protocols with unbal-
anced computational requirements. Our solution is to transfer scalar multiplications form
one parity to its communicating partner. The resulting scheme is denoted as the UECDH
key exchange scheme. Since scalar multiplication is the most time-consuming operation
in ECDH, the UECDH key exchange scheme is anticipated to significantly reduce the
computational burden on the limited party.
When applying the UECDH key exchange scheme to design AKE protocols, the biggest
challenge is how to establish authentication. Without authentication, two types of attack
will occur. The first one is the man-in-the-middle attack. It is inherited from DH and
ECDH key exchange schemes which do not contain any authentication of the exchanged
messages. The second one is the impersonation attack. It is caused partly by transferring
computations and partly by lacking authentication.
1.3 Contributions
To achieve the aforementioned aim and overcome the challenge, we utilize four different
authentication measures and design four sets of UECDH-based AKE protocols. The pro-
tocols are suitable for a variety of use cases. The main contributions of this thesis are
summarized as follows.
• Proposal of the method to unbalance computations in ECDH key exchange. The
method transfers one scalar multiplication from one party to another. It significantly
reduces the computational burden on the limited party since scalar multiplication is
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the most time-consuming operation in ECDH.
• Design of four sets of UECDH-based AKE protocols. The protocols have two ad-
vantages over similar protocols in international standards or specifications including
IEEE 802.15.6, TLS and Bluetooth 5.0. First, they are more suitable for communi-
cations between two devices with fairly different computational capabilities. Second,
they achieve a better overall performance by letting the more powerful party to un-
dertake computations on behalf of the limited one.
1.4 Publications
This thesis is partly based on the following publications. The contributions of the author
are also listed.
1. Jie Zhang, Nian Xue, Xin Huang. A Secure System for Pervasive Social Network-
based Healthcare. IEEE Access, Vol. 4, Pages 9239-9250, 2016.
Contributions of the author: (1) design of the improved IEEE 802.15.6 display au-
thenticated association protocol; (2) design of the protocol for blockchain consensus
mechanism; (3) design of the healthcare blockchain; (4) security analysis for proto-
cols; and (5) performance evaluation.
2. Jie Zhang, Xin Huang, Paul Craig, Alan Marshall, Dawei Liu. An Improved Proto-
col for the Password Authenticated Association of IEEE 802.15. 6 Standard That
Alleviates Computational Burden on the Node. Symmetry, Vol. 8, No. 11, Pages
131, 2016.
Contributions of the author: (1) illustration of attacks to the IEEE 802.15.6 password
authenticated association protocol; (2) design of the improved security protocol; (3)
security analysis for the improved protocol; and (4) performance evaluation.
3. Jiaren Cai, Xin Huang, Jie Zhang, Jiawei Zhao, Yaxi Lei, Dawei Liu, Xiaofeng Ma.
A Handshake Protocol with Unbalanced Cost for Wireless Updating. IEEE Access,
Vol. 6, No. 1, Pages 18570-18581, 2018.
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Contributions of the author: (1) design of the handshake protocol; and (2) security
analysis for the protocol.
4. Nian Xue, Xin Huang, Jie Zhang. S2Net: A Security Framework for Software Defined
Intelligent Building Networks. Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA, IEEE, 2016.
Contributions of the author: (1) design of the authenticated OpenFlow association
protocol; (2) desing of the secure OpenFlow message issuing protocol; and (3) security
analysis for the protocols.
5. Nian Xue, Lulu Liang, Jie Zhang, Xin Huang. POSTER: A Framework for IoT
Reprogramming. Proceedings of International Conference on Security and Privacy
in Communication Systems, Springer, Pages 751-754, 2016.
Contributions of the author: (1) design of OpenFunction authenticated handshake
protocol; and (2) design of OpenFunction messaging protocol.
6. Xin Huang, Dawei Liu, Jie Zhang. An Improved IEEE 802.15. 6 Password Authen-
ticated Association Protocol. Communications in China (ICCC), 2015 IEEE/CIC
International Conference on, 2015.
Contributions of the author: security analysis.
7. Ruiyang Xu, Xin Huang, Jie Zhang, Yulin Lu, Ge Wu, Zheng Yan. Software Defined
Intelligent Building. International Journal of Information Security and Privacy, Vol.
9, No. 3, pages 84-99, 2015.
Contributions of the author: (1) design of lightweight security mechanisms for Open-
Flow; and (2) security analysis.
8. Jie Zhang, Xin Huang, Andi Xu, Mi Li, Sihan Wu. An Enable Bitcoin Transaction
Automatic Ticketing Machine in Public Transport, Patent Number: ZL201620369250.7,
2016.
Contributions of the author: (1) protocol design; and (2) system design.
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9. Xin Huang, Kai Zheng, Jie Zhang, Nian Xue, Qiankun Sheng. An IoT-based Photo-
voltaic System, Patent Number: ZL201621140724.7, 2016.
Contributions of the author: (1) protocol design; and (2) system design.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the underlying cryp-
tography knowledge and related work. Chapter 3 introduces the method of unbalancing
computations in the ECDH key exchange scheme; and discusses security issues. The four
sets of UECDH-based AKE protocols are presented in Chapter 4 to 7 successively. Chap-
ter 4 presents the password UECDH-based AKE protocols; the security of the protocols
is studied; and the performance is compared with a similar protocol in IEEE 802.15.6. In
Chapter 5, the public key authenticated UECDH-based AKE protocols are presented; their
security is studied; and a similar protocol in TLS is chosen as the benchmark to compare
performances. In Chapter 6, the high bandwidth Out-of-Band (OOB) UECDH-based AKE
protocols are presented; their security is studied; and the performance is compared with
similar protocol in Bluetooth 5.0. In Chapter 7, the low bandwidth OOB UECDH-based
AKE protocols are presented; their security are analyzed; and the performance is compared
with similar protocols in IEEE 802.15.6 and Bluetooth 5.0. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes
the main contributions; and proposes future works.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This chapter reviews some underlying cryptography knowledge and related work. We
firstly introduce the definition of elliptic curve and the concept of ECC. Secondly, we
introduce cryptographic primitives that will be used in protocol design. Thirdly, we present
definition, architecture, and communication, attack and security models of a general AKE
protocol. Finally, we review AKE protocols in some international standards.
2.1 Elliptic Curves
2.1.1 Definition
Definition 2.1 (Elliptic Curves). An elliptic curve E over a field GF is defined by the
Weierstrass equation as follows
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (2.1)
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a5 ∈ GF and every point on E is non-singular (or “smooth”), that is,
there is no point at which the curve has more than one distinct tangent lines.
The elliptic curve E is composed of all solutions (x, y) of Equation 2.1 and ∞ which is
a point at infinity [46].
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2.1.2 Operations
• Point Addition +. Let P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) be two distinct points on an
elliptic curve E. The point addition of P and Q is denoted by P + Q. The sum is
also a point on E.
• Scalar Multiplication ×. Let t be an integer and P be a point on an elliptic curve E.
The scalar multiplication between t and P is denoted by t× P . The result is also a
point on E. It means
t× P = P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
.
When t is a large integer, computing a scalar multiplication is much more time-
consuming than computing a point addition [3, 5, 103].
2.1.3 Elliptic Curves For Cryptography
One type of elliptic curve E that is suitable for cryptography is defined as follows [68]:
y2 = x3 + ax+ b mod p, with a, b ∈ GF (p) and 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 (2.2)
where GF (p) is a prime finite field. Its order p (denoting the number of elements in the
finite field) is an odd prime. To determine an elliptic curve, the following parameters
should be given:
• p. The order of GF (p).
• r. The order of E.
• a and b. The coefficients.
• G = (Gx, Gy). The base point of E.
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2.1.4 Standards
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) - Federal Information Pro-
cessing Standards (FIPS) [79, 80] selects the following equation to define elliptic curves
used for cryptography.
y2 = x3 − 3x+ b mod p (2.3)
In Equation 2.3, the selection a = −3 for the coefficient of x is made for reasons of efficiency.
In the standard, five example elliptic curves are specified based on Equation 2.3: Curve
P-192, Curve P-224, Curve P-256, Curve P-384 and Curve P-521. The modular p of each
curve is listed as follows.
• Curve P-192. p = 2192 − 264 − 1.
• Curve P-224. p = 2224 − 296 + 1.
• Curve P-256. p = 2256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1.
• Curve P-384. p = 2384 − 2128 − 296 + 232 − 1
• Curve P-521. p = 2521 − 1
For more information about these curves, please refer to [79, 80].
2.1.5 Difficult Problems
The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
problem (ECDHP) [46] are the underlying difficult problems for the security of ECC and
ECDH-based schemes.
Definition 2.2 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)). Let E be an
elliptic curve defined over a finite field GF (p), P be a point on E of order n, and Q be
another point on E such that Q = xP for some unknown x ∈ [0, n − 1]. Given P and Q,
the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is to find x. We use the notation
ECDLP (Q) = x.
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Definition 2.3 (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECDHP)). Let E be an elliptic
curve defined over a finite field GF (p), P be a point on E of order n, and A and B be
points on E such that A = aP and B = bP for some unknown a, b ∈ [0, n−1]. Given P , A
and B, the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem (ECDHP) is to find the point C = abP .
We use the notation ECDHP (A,B) = C.
2.1.6 Advantages
A number of studies show that for the same level of security, the elliptic curve based
systems are implemented with much smaller parameters [61]. This leads to significant
performance advantages. As a result, elliptic curve based systems are widely adopted in
recent years. For example, all of the latest versions of the TLS standard, IEEE 802.15.6
standard, Bluetooth standard and IEEE 802.15.4 (Zigbee) standard define elliptic curve
based protocols.
2.2 Cryptographic Primitives
2.2.1 Message Authentication Code
A message authentication code (MAC) [58, 8] is defined by a pair of algorithms (MAC,VER).
The MAC takes a message m and a secret key k as inputs, and outputs a MAC mac. The
VER takes m, k and mac as inputs and outputs 1 (valid) or 0 (invalid). The algorithms
are denoted as follows.
MAC(k,m) = mac (2.4)
VER(k,m,mac) = {0, 1}
2.2.2 Digital Signature
A digital signature scheme [54] is defined by a pair of algorithms (SIGN,VERY). The
SIGN takes a message m and a private key sk as inputs, and outputs a signature σ. The
VERY takes m, σ and the corresponding public key pk as inputs, and outputs 1 (valid) or
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0 (invalid). The algorithms are denoted as follows.
SIGN(sk,m) = σ (2.5)
VERY(pk,m, σ) = {0, 1}
2.2.3 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [57] key exchange is a scheme that allows two
parties (each has a pair of elliptic curve public and private keys) to agree a shared secret
over an insecure channel. Denote the parties by A and B. A and B share an elliptic curve
E with the base point G. The ECDH key exchange scheme executes as follows.
1. A generates a random value SKA ∈ Z∗q , and computes PKA = SKA × G. Then A
sends PKA to B.
A→ B : PKA.
2. B generates a random value SKB ∈ Z∗q , and computes PKB = SKB × G. Then B
sends PKB to A.
B → A : PKB.
3. A computes the shared secret through the following equation:
K = SKA × PKB = SKA × SKB ×G. (2.6)
B computes the shared secret through the following equation:
K = SKB × PKA = SKA × SKB ×G. (2.7)
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2.3 Authenticated Key Exchange
2.3.1 Definitions
Definition 2.4 (Authenticated key establishment). Authenticated key establishment is a
cryptographic mechanism that provides two or more parties communicating over an open
network with a shared secret key.
The shared secret key is used subsequently by cryptographic primitives as we described
in Section 2.2 to achieve some security goals such as authentication, confidentiality or
integrity. There are two types of authenticated key establishment protocol: authenticated
key transport protocols and authenticated key agreement (or exchange) protocols [23].
They are introduced as follows.
• Key transport protocols [15, 13]. In a key transport protocol, the shared secret key
is created by one party and securely transmitted to the second party.
• Key agreement (or exchange) protocols [53, 93, 69, 94, 90]. In a key exchange pro-
tocol, both parties contribute information which is used to derive the shared secret
key.
This thesis is concerned with authenticated key exchange protocols with two parties.
We also consider the utilization of additional channels with certain security features be-
tween the parties. This has been adopted by a number of AKE protocols such as the
protocols in the IEEE standard 802.15.6, the Bluetooth specification 5.0 and the Zigbee
specification 3.0. The authenticated key exchange in this thesis is formally defined as
follows.
Definition 2.5 (Authenticate key exchange in this thesis). Authenticated key exchange
(AKE) is a cryptographic mechanism that provides two parties communicating mainly over
an open network with an authenticated shared secret key.
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2.3.2 Protocol Architecture
An AKE protocol is composed of the following three procedures.
• Initialization. This procedure initializes public and private parameters on both par-
ticipants. The parameters are long-term values. This procedure does not have to be
executed in each session of the protocol.
• Key exchange. This procedure generates ephemeral values, exchanges messages, and
generates a shared secret for a pair of participants.
• Session keys derivation. This procedure derives the session keys from the shared
secret on each participant. Different keys will be generated for different cryptographic
primitives.
2.3.3 Communication Model
The communication model of an AKE protocol (Figure 2.1) is defined by a pair of par-
ticipants and the communication channels between them. The participant who initiates
the protocol is denoted by the initiator. The other participant is denoted by the respon-
der. The thesis specifies the following two types of channels between the initiator and the
responder.
• Normal channels. Normal channels are Dolev-Yao channels [35]. All messages trans-
mitted via these channels can be overheard, deleted or modified by an attacker.
Examples of normal channels include the Internet, Bluetooth [45, 48, 28], Wi-Fi
[1, 12, 101] and Zigbee [7, 36, 26] networks. This thesis denotes the normal channels
by →.
• Out-of-band (OOB) channels. The OOB channels refer to empirical (or authentica-
tion) channels [78, 51, 6, 31, 20, 102]. All messages transmitted in these channels
are authentic and cannot be faked or modified. Examples of OOB channels include
human-controlled channels (such as scanning quick response (QR) code [56, 81], com-
paring short strings on displays or pressing buttons), human-controlled visible light
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Figure 2.1: Communication model of AKE protocols.
channels and human body channels. Some of them are high bandwidth OOB chan-
nels that can transmit long strings such as a public key; and some OOB channels are
low bandwidth channels that can only transmit short strings. This thesis denotes
OOB channels (both high bandwidth and low bandwidth ones) by ⇒.
2.3.4 Attack Model
We at first present the basic assumptions. Then under the assumptions, we define the
attack model that specifies what the attacker is able to do.
Basic assumptions
The attacker is unable to break the MAC and digital signature algorithms. That is, for a
MAC computed as mac = MAC(k,m), the attacker finds it difficult to generate a mac′ such
that VER(k,m,mac′) = 1 without k; and for a signature computed as δ = SIGN(sk,m),
the attacker finds it difficult to generate a σ′ such that VERY(pk,m, σ′) = 1 without sk.
In addition, the attacker is unable to alter, insert, delay or delete messages transmitted
via the OOB channels.
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Attack model
• Basic ability. The attacker is able to control the communications over normal chan-
nels between the initiator and the responder. That is, the attacker can observe all
messages sent, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages or delete messages
in the normal channels.
• Stronger ability 1. The attacker is able to obtain any previous session keys.
• Stronger ability 2. The attacker may compromise long-term secret keys of the initia-
tor or the responder.
There are two well-known attacks that the attackers have some of the above abilities,
that is, the man-in-the-middle attack [22] and the impersonation attack [109]. The two
attacks are the most commonly encountered threats to AKE protocols.
• The man-in-the-middle attack (shown in Figure 2.2). In this attack, the attacker
relays and modifies the communication between two parties who believe they are
communicating with each other. To launch a man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker
is able to intercept all messages transmitted between the two victimized parties and
inject new ones.
• The impersonation attack (shown in Figure 2.3). In this attack, the attacker claims to
be the first party and communicates with the second party. To launch an imperson-
ation attack to an AKE protocol, the attacker have to compromise the authentication
information (such as the long-term secret keys) of the first party. This is known as
the key compromise impersonation attack.
2.3.5 Security Goals
Let A and B be two honest participants of an AKE protocol, that is, they execute the
steps of the protocol correctly [16, 99]. Security goals are explained as follows.
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Figure 2.2: The man-in-the-middle attack.
Figure 2.3: The impersonation attack
• Key authentication [10, 34, 41]. A completed run of an AKE protocol between A
and B should produce a secret that is shared only by A and B other than any other
party.
• Key confidentiality. A completed run of an AKE protocol between A and B should
produce a secret that can not be computed by any other party aside from A and B.
• Key integrity. After a completed run of an AKE protocol between A and B, the
secret computed by A should be equivalent with that computed by B.
• Key confirmation [67, 37, 70]. After a completed run of an AKE protocol between A
and B, both A and B have receive evidence confirming that the other party knows
the secret.
• Known-key security (key freshness) [43, 42]. Each run of an AKE protocol between
A and B should produce a unique secret key (i.e., the session key). This attribute is
also known as key freshness.
• Forward secrecy [2, 83, 32, 59, 18]. If long-term private keys of A and/or B are
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compromised, the secrecy of previous session keys is not affected.
In addition to the above goals, special security goals are also required by specific AKE
protocols. Two special security goals involved in this thesis are introduced as follows.
• Resistance to dictionary attacks [73, 100, 11, 74]. This goal is required by an AKE
protocol that utilizes passwords. It guarantees that an eavesdropper who can record
the transcript of one or more sessions cannot eliminate a significant number of possible
passwords.
• Resistance to combinatorial search attacks such as the birthday attack [40, 30, 9, 107].
This goal is required by an AKE protocol that uses short hash functions to generate
authentication information. It guarantees that general or multiple-shot attacks give
the attacker no advantage over guess.
2.3.6 Cost Model
Generally, the cost of an AKE protocol is evaluated through communicating and compu-
tational costs as follows.
• Communicating cost. The evaluation of communicating cost has two aspects:
– Number of passes, i.e., the number of messages exchanged.
– Communicating overhead, i.e., the overall number of bits transmitted.
• Computational Cost. The computational cost is evaluated as follows:
– On-line computational cost on the initiator, i.e., the number of arithmetical
operations required on the initiator.
– On-line computational cost on the responder, i.e., the number of arithmetical
operations required on the responder.
– Overall computational overhead, i.e., the total number of arithmetical opera-
tions required.
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In this thesis, we mainly focus on the computational cost, in particular, the on-line
computational cost. It is studied via the following two methods:
• Theoretical evaluation. This method counts the number of time-consuming arith-
metical operations involved in each run of the protocol.
• Experimental test. This method realizes and runs a prototype of the protocol to test
computational time.
2.4 Authenticated Key Exchange In Standards
2.4.1 IEEE 802.15.6
IEEE 802.15.6 [97] is the international standard for wireless body area networks (WBANs)
[62, 60, 24, 87, 92]. It includes a suite of ECDH-based authenticated association protocols
(i.e., AKE protocols) that generate authenticated shared keys for a node and a hub. The
protocols are briefly introduced as follows.
• Public key hidden association. The public key hidden association protocol is denoted
as IEEE PK Hidden in this thesis. It requires the hub have the public key of the
node in advance of running the protocol. The node’s public key is kept secretly in
the protocol to help to prevent third parties from launching impersonation attacks.
• Password authenticated association. The password authenticated association proto-
col is denoted as IEEE PW in this thesis. It requires the node and hub have a secretly
shared password before the running the protocol. The password helps to keep third
parties from launching impersonation attacks.
• Display authenticated association. The display authenticated association is denoted
as IEEE Display in this thesis. It requires the node and hub each to have a display
of a 5-digit decimal number before running the protocol. The display is a type of
low bandwidth OOB channel that helps to keep attackers from launching man-in-
the-middle attacks.
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2.4.2 Bluetooth
Bluetooth wireless technology (or Bluetooth for short) is a short-range, robust and low cost
communications system which aims to replace the cable(s) connecting portable and/or fixed
electronic devices. The Bluetooth security model includes five distinct security features:
pairing, bonding, device authentication, encryption and message integrity. The pairing,
bonding and device authentication constitute an AKE protocol that establishes shared
and authenticated keys for devices. The encryption and message integrity are related with
secure communications protected by the shared keys. We summarize the ECDH-based
AKE protocols in Bluetooth Specification version 5.0 (denoted as Bluetooth 5.0) [85] as
follows.
• Numeric comparison association. The numeric comparison association is denoted as
Bluetooth Display in this thesis. It requires both devices to be capable of displaying
a six digit number and both to be capable of having the user enter “yes” or “no”.
• Just works association. The just works association is similar with the numeric com-
parison association. It is suitable for scenarios where at least one of the devices does
not have a display for a six digit number. It also uses numeric comparison scheme.
• Out-of-Band (OOB) association. The OOB association is denoted as Bluetooth OOB
in this thesis. It requires the communicating devices can establish OOB channels that
provide different security properties compared with the Bluetooth radio channel.
• Passkey entry association. The Passkey entry association is suitable for scenarios
that one device has a keyboard but does not have a display; and the other device
has a display for a six digit number. It is essentially a numeric comparison scheme.
The user is shown a six digit number on the device with a display, and is then asked
to enter the number on the other device.
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2.4.3 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) [71] defines cryptographic protocols that provide
communications security over a computer network. It involves a suit of handshake protocols
that establish shared secret keys for a server and a client. After the handshake, the shared
keys are used to protect the application layer traffic. The latest version of TLS specification,
i.e., TLS 1.3, involves the ECDH-based handshake protocol. The protocol requires the two
parties have authenticated public key of each other. This is often realized through a public
key certificate. In this thesis, we denote this protocol as TLS PK Authenticated.
2.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented preliminary cryptography knowledge and related work. In
particular, we formally defined the general architecture, communication model, attack
model, secure goals and cost model of an AKE protocol. We also summarized ECDH-
based AKE protocols in international standards or specifications for communication or
security. These protocols will be set as the benchmarks for protocols proposed in this
thesis.
Chapter 3
Unbalancing ECDH Key Exchange
This chapter introduces the method to unbalance computations in the ECDH key exchange
scheme. In particular, the scalar multiplications are transferred from one party to its
communicating partner. We firstly present the scenario where communications take place
between two devices with fairly different computational capabilities. Secondly, we illustrate
how to transfer one scalar multiplication from the initiator to the responder, and how to
transfer oppositely. The resulting schemes are named UECDH key exchange schemes.
Thirdly, we discuss two severe attacks to the UECDH schemes. The first one is the man-
in-the-middle attack. It is inherited from the ECDH key exchange scheme. The second one
is the impersonation attack. It is caused partly by the transferring of computational tasks.
Under the impersonation attack, the attacker can impersonate the party who undertakes
more computational tasks. Lacking authentication mechanisms is the main reason leading
to these attacks. Therefore, we introduce a number of authentication measures that help
to remove these attacks.
3.1 Scenario
3.1.1 Background
In the rest of this thesis, we refer the communications between two devices with unbal-
anced computation resources as “unbalanced communications”. The background of the
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unbalanced communications is summarized as follows.
Unbalanced communications in the past. Mobile terminals were once constrained
devices with limited computational resources and poor power supply. There was consider-
able interest in designing security protocols for communications between a mobile terminal
and a server (or base station). A typical solution is transferring computational tasks from
the mobile terminal to the server during the key establish processes between them. For
example, the protocol in [82] lets the server carry out one exponentiation on behalf of the
mobile terminal in the widely applied Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange process. Since
the exponentiation is a time-consuming operation, the computational cost on the mobile
terminal is significantly reduced.
Unbalanced communications in the present. The modern society has witnessed
the tremendous increase in the availability of computational resources. Nowadays, mobile
terminals are able to offer quite impressive computational resources. However, there still
are large numbers of devices with limited computational power, such as battery-powered
and wirelessly connected sensors that are widely used in environment monitoring, water-
quality monitoring, eHealth and so on. Moreover, these computationally limited devices
are even much less powerful than the mobile terminals that were used many years before.
As a result, ECDH key exchange protocols are widely adopted in recent years since they
provide higher level of security with less computational requirements; and there is an urgent
requirement for unbalancing computations in the ECDH key exchange protocols.
3.1.2 Features
The core feature of the scenario is the unequal computational resources of the communi-
cating parties. In addition, the scenario should also has two other features. We summarize
the features as follows.
• Unequal computational resources. The two communicating parties have significantly
unequal computational resources. It is inconvenient or infeasible for the computa-
tionally limited party to undertake heavy computational tasks. This feature requires
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unbalancing computations of protocols for the scenario.
• Demand for security. The communications require security, such as authentication
between the parties, and authentication, integrity and confidentiality of the messages.
This feature requires security mechanisms for the scenario.
• Security vulnerability of main communication channels. The main communication
channels are vulnerable to attacks. This feature requires security mechanisms, espe-
cially key establishment, for the scenario.
3.2 Unbalancing Computations In ECDH Protocol
Two methods are introduced to unbalance the computations in the ECDH key exchange
scheme. The first one lets the responder carry out one scalar multiplication on behalf
of the initiator. The second one lets the initiator to undertake one scalar multiplication
on behalf of the responder. Since the scalar multiplication is the most time-consuming
operation in the ECDH scheme, the methods significantly reduce the computational cost
on the initiator or the responder. The two methods are named as UECDH. The resulting
schemes are named as UECDH schemes.
3.2.1 Initialization
Before the execution of the UECDH schemes, the initiator and the responder shall possess
their private and public keys respectively. The private keys should be integers belonging
to the same finite field Z∗q . The public keys should be points on the same elliptic curve E
with the base point G. Denote the initiator by A and the responder by B. Formally, the
initialization procedure generates the following values:
• Common parameters shared by A and B: comm = (Z∗q , E,G).
• Private and public keys of A: (SKA, PKA) where SKA ∈ Z∗q and PKA = SKA×G.
SKA is secretly held by A. PKA is a public information that can be obtained by B.
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• Private and public keys of B: (SKB, PKB) where SKB ∈ Z∗q and PKB = SKB×G.
SKB is secretly held by B. PKB is a public information that can be obtained by A.
Note that the initialization does not belong to the UECDH key exchange process since
the parameters and keys are long-term values. These values need not to be generated in
every execution of the UECDH key exchange schemes.
3.2.2 Transferring Computational Tasks From A to B
Suppose the initiator A is a computationally limited device, and the responder B is much
more powerful than A. The following UECDH scheme transfers one scalar multiplication
from A to B.
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UA = RA + SKA.
Then A sends UA and PKA to B, i.e.,
A→ B : UA, PKA
2. B generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UB = RB + SKB
and
TB = UB ×G.
Then B sends TB and PKB to A, i.e.,
B → A : TB, PKB
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Table 3.1: Comparison of scalar multiplication on A and B.
Scalar multiplication on A B Total
ECDH 2 2 4
UECDH in Section 3.2.2 1 3 4
3. A computes the shared secret through the following equation:
KA = RA × (TB − PKB).
B computes the shared secret through the following equations:
TA = UA ×G,
KB = RB × (TA − PKA).
The above scheme requires one scalar multiplication on A, and three scalar multiplica-
tions on B (Table 3.1). Compared with the ECDH scheme, it significantly reduces the
computational cost on the initiator A.
Below we will prove that KA = KB.
Proof.
KA = RA × (TB − PKB)
= RA × ((RB + SKB)×G− PKB)
= RA × (RB ×G+ SKB ×G− PKB)
= RA × (RB ×G+ PKB − PKB)
= RA × (RB ×G)
= RA ×RB ×G
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KB = RB × (TA − PKA)
= RB × ((RA + SKA)×G− PKA)
= RB × (RA ×G+ SKA ×G− PKA)
= RB × (RA ×G+ PKA − PKA)
= RB × (RA ×G)
= RB ×RA ×G
= RA ×RB ×G
= KA
3.2.3 Transferring Computational Tasks From B to A
Suppose the initiator A has abundant computational resources, and the responder B is
a computationally limited device. The following UECDH protocol transfers one scalar
multiplication from B to A.
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UA = RA + SKA
and
TA = UA ×G.
Then A sends TA and PKA to B, i.e.,
A→ B : TA, PKA.
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Table 3.2: Comparison of scalar multiplication on A and B.
Scalar multiplication on A B Total
ECDH 2 2 4
UECDH in Section 3.2.3 3 1 4
2. B generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UB = RB + SKB.
Then B sends UB and PKB to A, i.e.,
B → A : UB, PKB.
3. A computes the shared secret through the following equations:
TB = UB ×G,
KA = RA × (TB − PKB).
B computes the shared secret through the following equation:
KB = RB × (TA − PKA).
The above scheme successfully transfers the computation of TB from B to A. As
a result, A undertakes three scalar multiplications, and B undertakes only one scalar
multiplication (Table 3.2). Compared with the ECDH scheme, this protocol significantly
reduces the computational cost on the limited responder B. The shared secrets computed
by A and B are equivalent. The proof is similar as the one in Section 3.2.2.
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3.3 Security Issues
The UECDH key exchange schemes in Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.2.3 are vulnerable to
two attacks: the man-in-the-middle attack and the impersonation attack. We illustrate
these attacks, identify the reasons causing these attacks, and introduce four methods to
remove these attacks as follows.
3.3.1 The Man-In-The-Middle Attack
The vulnerability to the man-in-the-middle attack is inherited from the ECDH key ex-
change scheme. The fundamental limitation of the ECDH scheme is that it does not contain
any authentication of the exchanged messages. Similarly, the UECDH schemes in Section
3.2.2 and Section 3.2.3 do not contain any authentication of the exchange messages. It
leads to the vulnerability to the man-in-the-middle attack. Denote the man-in-the-middle
attacker by C, and the private and public keys of C by SKC and PKC . The attacks to
the two UECDH schemes are described as follows. They are also illustrated in Figure 3.1
and Figure 3.2.
The man-in-the-middle attack to the UECDH scheme in Section 3.2.2
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UA = RA + SKA.
Then A sends UA and PKA to B, i.e.,
A→ B : UA, PKA
2. C firstly intercepts (UA, PKA).
Secondly, C generates a random value RC ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UC = RC + SKC
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At last, C sends a forged message (UC , PKC) to B, i.e.,
C → B : UC , PKC
3. B generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UB = RB + SKB
and
TB = UB ×G.
Then B sends TB and PKB to A, i.e.,
B → A : TB, PKB
4. C firstly intercepts (TB, PKB).
Then C computes
TC = UC ×G.
Finally, C sends a forged message (TC , PKC) to A, i.e.,
C → A : TC , PKC
5. A computes the shared secret through the following equation:
KA = RA × (TC − PKC).
B computes the shared secret through the following equations:
TC = UC ×G,
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Figure 3.1: The man-in-the-middle attack to the UECDH scheme in Section 3.2.2.
KB = RB × (TC − PKC).
C computes the shared secrets with A and B through the following equations:
TA = UA ×G,
KCA = RC × (TA − PKA),
KCB = RC × (TB − PKB).
Now we will prove that KA = KCA and KB = KCB.
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Proof.
KA = RA × (TC − PKC)
= RA × ((RC + SKC)×G− PKC)
= RA × (RC ×G+ PKC − PKC)
= RA × (RC ×G)
= RA ×RC ×G
KCA = RC × (TA − PKA)
= RC × ((RA + SKA)×G− PKA)
= RC × (RA ×G+ PKA − PKA)
= RC ×RA ×G = KA
KB = RB × (TC − PKC)
= RB × ((RC + SKC)×G− PKC)
= RB × (RC ×G+ PKC − PKC)
= RB × (RC ×G)
= RB ×RC ×G
KCB = RC × (TB − PKB)
= RC × ((RB + SKB)×G− PKB)
= RC × (RB ×G+ PKB − PKB)
= RC ×RB ×G = KB
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Therefore, after the above attack, C shares a secret KCA = KA with A and a secret
KCB = KB with B. However, both A and B think they share a secret with each other.
The man-in-the-middle attack to the UECDH scheme in Section 3.2.3
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UA = RA + SKA,
and
TA = UA ×G.
Then A sends TA and PKA to B, i.e.,
A→ B : TA, PKA
2. C firstly intercepts (TA, PKA).
Then C generates a random value RC ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UC = RC + SKC ,
TC = UC ×G.
At last, C sends a forged message (TC , PKC) to B, i.e.,
C → B : TC , PKC
3. B generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UB = RB + SKB
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Then B sends UB and PKB to A, i.e.,
B → A : TB, PKB.
4. C firstly intercepts (TB, PKB).
Then C sends a forged message (UC , PKC) to B, i.e.,
C → B : UC , PKC
5. A computes the shared secret through the following equations:
TC = UC ×G,
KA = RA × (TC − PKC).
B computes the shared secret through the following equation:
KB = RB × (TC − PKC).
C computes the shared secrets with A and B through the following equations:
KCA = RC × (TA − PKA),
TB = UB ×G,
KCB = RC × (TB − PKB).
Similarly as we proved before, KCA = KA and KCB = KB. Therefore, after the above
attack, C shares a secret KCA = KA with A and a secret KCB = KB with B. However,
both A and B think they share a secret with each other.
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Figure 3.2: The man-in-the-middle attack to the UECDH scheme in Section 3.2.3.
3.3.2 The Impersonation Attack
The impersonation attack is caused partly by the transferring of scaler multiplication from
A to B (Section 3.2.2) or from B to A (Section 3.2.3). In particular, in the UECDH scheme
in Section 3.2.2, A computes the shared secret from RA, TB and PKB. The computation
of the secret does not involve the long-term secret of B (i.e. SKB); therefore, an attacker
can impersonate B and execute the scheme with A. Similarly, in the UECDH scheme in
Section 3.2.3, B computes the shared secret from RB, TA and PKA. The computation of
the secret does not involve the long-term secret (i.e., SKA) of A; as a result, an attacker
can impersonate A and execute the scheme with B.
Denote the impersonation attacker by C, and the private and public keys of C by SKC
and PKC . These attacks are described as follows. They are also illustrated in Figure 3.3
and Figure 3.4.
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The impersonation attack to the UECDH scheme in Section 3.2.2
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UA = RA + SKA.
Then A sends UA and PKA to B, i.e.,
A→ B : UA, PKA
2. C firstly intercepts and blocks (UA, PKA).
Secondly, C generates a random value RC ∈ Z∗q , and computes
TC = RC ×G+ PKB
At last, C impersonates B and sends (TC , PKB) to A, i.e.,
C → A : TC , PKC
3. A computes the shared secret through the following equation:
KA = RA × (TC − PKB).
C computes the shared secrets with A and B through the following equations:
TA = UA ×G,
KC = RC × (TA − PKA),
Below we will prove that KA = KC .
38 Jie Zhang
Figure 3.3: The impersonation attack to the UECDH scheme in Section 3.2.2.
Proof.
KA = RA × (TC − PKB)
= RA × (RC ×G+ PKB − PKB)
= RA × (RC ×G)
= RA ×RC ×G.
KC = RC × (TA − PKA)
= RC × ((RA + SKA)×G− PKA)
= RC × (RA ×G+ PKA − PKA)
= RC × (RA ×G)
= RC ×RA ×G
= KA
Therefore, after the above attack, C establishes a shared secret KA = KC with A.
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However, A thinks he (or she) shares a secret with B.
The impersonation attack to the UECDH scheme in Section 3.2.3
1. C generates a random value RC ∈ Z∗q , and computes
TC = RC ×G+ PKA.
Then C impersonates A and sends TC and PKA to B, i.e.,
C → B : TC , PKA
2. B generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UB = RB + SKB
Then B sends UB and PKB to C, i.e.,
B → A : UB, PKB
3. C computes the shared secret through the following equations:
TB = UB ×G,
KC = RC × (TB − PKB).
B computes the shared secret through the following equation:
KB = RB × (TC − PKA).
Bellow we will prove that KC = KB.
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Figure 3.4: The impersonation attack to the UECDH scheme in Section 3.2.3.
Proof.
KC = RC × (TB − PKB)
= RC × ((RB + SKB)×G− PKB)
= RC × (RB ×G+ PKB − PKB)
= RC × (RB ×G)
= RC ×RB ×G.
KB = RB × (TC − PKA)
= RB × ((RC ×G+ PKA)− PKA)
= RB × (RC ×G)
= RB ×RC ×G
= KC .
Therefore, after the above attack, C establishes a shared secret KC = KB with B.
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However, B thinks he (or she) shares a secret with A.
3.4 Solutions To The Security Issues
We have discussed the reasons for the security issues in the UECDH schemes. In order
to solve these issues, we introduce a number of solutions to remove each attack. These
solutions are not absolutely separated. It is recommended to combine and integrate some
of them. This is illustrated through specific protocols in the following four chapters (4, 5,
6 and 7).
3.4.1 Removing The Man-In-The-Middle Attacks
The vulnerability to the man-in-the-middle attacks is caused by the lack of authentication
messages in the schemes. Therefore, a direct method to remove this attack is adding
authentication information in the exchanged messages. Bellow are three typical methods
to establish authentication information.
• The method based on pre-shared secrets. This method requires the two parties
securely share a secret in advance. With the shared the secret, the two parties can
use MAC to authenticate the identities and exchanged messages.
• The method based on authenticated public keys. This method requires the two
parties have the authenticated public keys of each other. The two parties can use
digital signature to authenticate each other and the exchange messages.
• The method based on OOB channels with appropriate security features. This method
requires the two parties can establish OOB channels in addition to the basic communi-
cating channels. The OOB channels are used to establish and transfer authentication
information.
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3.4.2 Removing The Impersonation Attacks
The vulnerability to the impersonation attacks is caused partly by the lack of the long-
term secret key of one party (who carries out more scalar multiplications) in computing the
shared secret. As a result, this party can be impersonated by the attacker. The authenti-
cation methods introduced in Section 3.4.1 can help to remove the impersonation attacks.
Therefore, the recommended methods to remove the impersonation attacks include:
• The method based on pre-shared secrets.
• The method based on authenticated public keys.
• The method based on OOB channels with appropriate security features.
3.4.3 Discussion
The man-in-the-middle attack and the impersonation attack are not completely separated
from each other. More specifically, in the man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker imper-
sonates A and communicates with B; meanwhile, the attacker impersonates B and com-
municates with A. The proposed solutions to remove the two attacks are not separated
neither. The advisable solution should combine the solutions to remove both the two types
of attacks.
3.5 Chapter Summary
The majority of AKE protocols require equivalent computational cost on the parties. How-
ever, in practice, many communications take place between two parties with fairly different
computational resources, for example, a mobile phone and a cloud server, a sensor and a
base station, and so on. It is significant to reduce the computational cost on a computa-
tionally limited device in an AKE protocol. An ingenious method has been illustrated by
the unbalanced DH key exchange scheme. It transfers the time-consuming exponentiation
from the computationally limited party to its much more powerful communicating partner.
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The rapid development of communicating technologies interconnects numerous devices
including many computationally limited sensors. It is highly recommended to base the
security mechanisms for sensors on elliptic curve cryptographic schemes. For example,
the ECDH-based AKE protocols are adopted by many communicating techniques and
standards such as the Bluetooth, IEEE 802.15.6 and so on. In this context, it is significant
to study how to unbalance computations in ECDH key exchange scheme and ECDH-based
AKE protocols.
In this chapter, we studied how to unbalance computations in the ECDH key exchange
scheme. Two UECDH key exchange schemes were proposed; and two attacks to the schemes
were illustrated. The solutions to remove these attacks were discussed. In the following
four chapters, we will apply these solutions to design UECDH-based AKE protocols that
are resistant to these attacks.
Chapter 4
Password UECDH-based AKE
Protocols
Password is a short pre-shared secret to establish authentication. It can be remem-
bered by humans; and does not require secure memory which is often expensive. There-
fore, password-based AKE protocols are popular in IoT scenarios where the devices are
capability-limited and unable to securely store long pre-shared secrets. For example, the
IEEE Standard 802.15.6 includes a password authenticated association protocol.
This chapter introduces password UECDH-based AKE protocols. The two parties share
a password in advance of the protocols; and the password is input by users in each session
of the protocols to achieve authentication. Firstly, we provide an overview of the communi-
cation model, attack model and security model of the protocols. Secondly, we will present
the two password UECDH-based AKE protocols: Protocol I-A which requires less scalar
multiplications on A than on B and Protocol I-B which requires less scalar multiplications
on B than A. Thirdly, we analyze the security of the protocols according to the attack
model and security model. In particular, we illustrate how the man-in-the-middle and
impersonation attacks to the protocols fail. At last, we compare the performance of the
two protocols with the IEEE PW protocol through theoretical evaluation and experimental
test.
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4.1 Overview
4.1.1 Communication Model
The communication model of a password UECDH-based AKE protocol is specified as
follows.
• Participants. In each session of the protocol, there are two participants. The par-
ticipants are denoted by their identities A and B. A is the initiator, and B is the
responder. In particular, A and B have significantly different computational capa-
bilities.
• Channels. The channels between A and B are normal channels.
4.1.2 Attack Model
The following assumptions and ability specification define what an attacker to a password
UECDH-based AKE protocol is able and unable to do.
• Basic assumption 1. The attacker is unable to break the MAC algorithm.
• Basic assumption 2. The attacker is unable to reveal the password.
• Basic ability. The attacker is able to observe all messages, alter messages, insert
new messages, delay messages or delete messages transmitted between A and B via
normal channels.
• Stronger ability 1. The attacker is able to obtain any previous session keys.
• Stronger ability 2. The attacker is able to compromise the long-term secret keys of
A or B.
4.1.3 Security Model
Under the above attack model, a password UECDH-based AKE protocol aims to achieve
the following security goals:
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• Key authentication under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Key confidentiality under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Key integrity under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Key confirmation under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Known-key security (key freshness) under the attack model that the attacker has the
basic ability and the stronger ability 1.
• Forward secrecy under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability and
the stronger ability 2.
• Resistance to dictionary attacks under the attack model that the attacker has the
basic ability.
4.2 Protocol Description
4.2.1 Protocol I-A
Protocol I-A generates a shared secret for a computationally limited initiator A and a more
powerful responder B. It transfers one scalar multiplication from A to B. The protocol is
described through the following procedures: initialization, key exchange and session keys
computation. It is also illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Initialization
Before the execution of Protocol I-A, the initiator and the responder should obtain their
private and public keys respectively. The private keys should be integers in the same finite
field. The public keys should be points on the same elliptic curve. In addition, the initiator
and the responder should share a password and a one-way function that maps the password
to a point on the elliptic curve.
Denote the initiator by A, the responder by B, the finite field by Z∗q , the elliptic curve
by E, the base point of E by G, the private and public keys of A by SKA and PKA, the
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Figure 4.1: Protocol I-A.
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private and public keys of B by SKB and PKB, the password by PW and the one-way
function by Q. Formally, the initialization procedure generates the following values:
• Common parameters shared by A and B: comm = (Z∗q , E,G,Q).
• Secret information shared by A and B: PW that is kept secret and do not be stored
in the device.
• Information held only by A: PKA and SKA where SKA should be securely stored.
• Information held only by B: PKB and SKB; and both should be securely stored.
Key Exchange
• A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UA = RA + SKA.
Then A sends B M1 as follows:
A→ B : M1 = (A,UA, PKA).
• Upon receiving M1, B firstly generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q and computes TB
and PKB as follows:
UB = RB + SKB,
TB = UB ×G,
PKB = PKB −Q(PW ).
Secondly, B computes the shared secret KB as follows:
TA = UA ×G,
KB = RB × (TA − PKA).
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Thirdly, B computes a message authentication code macB as follows:
macB = MAC(KBx, B‖TB‖PKB)
where KBx denotes the x coordinate of KB.
Finally, B sends A M2 as follows:
B → A : M2 = (B, TB, PKB,macB).
• Upon receiving M2, A firstly computes the shared key KA as follows:
PKB = PKB +Q(PW )
K = RA × (TB − PKB).
Secondly, A verifies macB as follows:
VER(KAx, B‖TB‖PKB,macB) =
 1, valid0, invalid
where KAx denotes the x coordinate of KA.
Thirdly, if macB is valid, A computes a message authentication code macA as follows:
macA = MAC(KAx, A‖UA‖PKA).
Finally, A sends B M3 as follows
A→ B : M3 = macA
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• Upon receiving macA, B verifies macA as follows:
VER(KBx, A‖UA‖PKA,macA) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Session Keys Computation
If macB is valid, A derives the session keys from KAy as follows:
KENC = F(KAy, 1),
KMAC = F(KAy, 2),
where KAy denotes the y coordinate of KA.
If macA is valid, B derives the session keys from KBy as follows:
KENC = F(KBy, 1),
KMAC = F(KBy, 2),
where KBy denotes the y coordinate of KB.
After the AKE process, KENC will be used by symmetric encryption algorithms; and
KMAC will be used by MAC algorithms.
4.2.2 Protocol I-B
Protocol I-B shares a secret between a powerful initiator A and a computationally lim-
ited responder B. It transfers one scalar multiplication from B to A. We describe the
protocol through the following procedures: initialization, key exchange and session keys
computation in detail. In addition, we also illustrate the procedures through Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Protocol I-B.
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Initialization
The initialization here is similar with that of Protocol I-A. Let the notations A, B, Z∗q , E,
G,SKA, PKA, SKB, PKB PW and Q be the same as we specified in Section 4.2.1. The
initialization procedure produces the following values:
• Common parameters shared by A and B: comm = (Z∗q , E,G,Q).
• Secret information shared by A and B: PW .
• Information held only by A: PKA and SKA; and both should be securely stored.
• Information held only by B: PKB and SKB where SKB should be securely stored.
Key Exchange
• A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q . A computes
UA = RA + SKA,
TA = UA ×G.
PKA = PKA −Q(PW )
Then A sends B M1 as follows:
A→ B : M1 = (A, TA, PKA).
• Upon receiving M1, B firstly generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q and computes
UB = RB + SKB.
Secondly, B computes the shared secret KB as follows:
PKA = PKA +Q(PW ),
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KB = RB × (TA − PKA).
Thirdly, B computes a message authentication code macB as follows:
macB = MAC(KBx, B‖TB‖PKB).
Finally, B sends A M2 as follows:
B → A : M2 = (B,UB, PKB,macB).
• Upon receiving M2, A firstly computes the shared secret as follows:
TB = UB ×G,
KA = RA × (TB − PKB).
Secondly, A verifies macB as follows:
VER(KAx, B‖UB‖PKB,macB) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Thirdly, if macB is valid, A computes message authentication code macA as follows:
macA = MAC(KAx, A‖TA‖PKA).
Finally, A sends B M3 as follows:
A→ B : M3 = macA
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• Upon receiving macA, B verifies macA as follows:
VER(KBx, A‖TA‖PKA,macA) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Session Keys Computation
If macB is valid, A derives the session keys from KAy as follows:
KENC = F(KAy, 1),
KMAC = F(KAy, 2).
If macA is valid, B derives the session keys from KBy as follows:
KENC = F(KBy, 1),
KMAC = F(KBy, 2).
4.3 Security
This section illustrates that the two password UECDH-based AKE protocols achieve the
security goals (Section 4.1.3) under the attack model (Section 4.1.2). For each security
goal, we provide a proposition that states a security feature, and prove how the proposition
stands. In addition, we also show how the two protocols resist the man-in-the-middle attack
and the impersonation attack.
4.3.1 Security Features
Proposition 4.1 (Key authentication of Protocol I-A and I-B). Assume there is an attack-
er C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages
or delete messages transmitted between A and B via normal channels. After a completed
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run of Protocol I-A (or I-B), A (or B) believes that he (or she) shares a secret with B (or
A) other than any other party.
Proof. (1) A completed run of Protocol I-A is defined by the validation of macA and macB;
and the validation of macA and macB guarantees the authenticity of UA, PKA, TB and
PKB.
(2) A computes the shared secret KA from RA × (TB − PKB). RA is the random
value generated by A. TB is authenticated according to (1). PKB is computed from
PKB + Q(PW ) where PW is a pre-shared secret stored by A and PKB is authenticated
according to (1). Therefore, A believes he or she shares a secret with B other than any
other party.
(3) B computes the shared secret KB from RB × (UA ×G− PKA). RB is the random
value generated by B. UA and PKA are authenticated according to (1). Therefore, B
believes he or she shares a secret with A other than any other party.
According to (2) and (3), we have the conclusion that Protocol I-A provides key au-
thentication. Similarly we can prove that Protocol I-B provides key authentication.
Proposition 4.2 (Key confidentiality of Protocol I-A and I-B). Assume there is an attack-
er C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages
or delete messages transmitted between A and B via normal channels. After a completed
run of Protocol I-A (or I-B), the attacker is unable to derive the shared key of A and B.
Proof. (1) The shared secret can be computed from any of the following equations:
KA = RA × (TB − PKB),
KB = RB × (UA ×G− PKA),
K = RA ×RB ×G,
Therefore, RA or RB is required to compute the shared secret.
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(2) RA is hidden by the following equation:
UA = RA + SKA.
Therefore, SKA is required to compute RA.
RB is hidden by the following equation:
TB = (RB + SKB)×G.
Therefore, SKB is required to compute RB.
(3) According to the attack model, C has neither SKA nor SKB. C is unable to
compute RA or RB. Therefore, C is unable to compute KA = KB = K.
Therefore, we have the conclusion that Protocol I-A provides key confidentiality. Sim-
ilarly we can prove that Protocol I-B provides key confidentiality.
Proposition 4.3 (Key integrity of Protocol I-A and I-B). Assume there is an attacker
C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages or
delete messages transmitted between A and B via normal channels. After a completed run
of Protocol I-A (or I-B), A and B compute the equal secret.
Proof. (1) As we proved in Theorem 5.1, a completed run of Protocol I-A implies the
authenticity of UA, PKA, TB and PKB (or PKB).
(2) The secret KA is computed by A from
KA = RA × (TB − PKB)
= RA × (UB ×G− PKB)
= RA × ((RB + SKB)×G− PKB)
= RA ×RB ×G.
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The secret KB is computed by B from
KB = RB × (UA ×G− PKA)
= RB × ((RA + SKA)×G− PKA)
= RBRA ×G
= RA ×RB ×G
= KA
Therefore, after a completed run of Protocol I-A, A and B compute the equal secret.
We have the conclusion that Protocol I-A provides key integrity. Similarly we can prove
that Protocol I-B provides key integrity.
Proposition 4.4 (Key confirmation of Protocol I-A and I-B). Assume there is an attacker
C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages or
delete messages transmitted between A and B via normal channels. After a completed run
of Protocol I-A (or I-B), both A and B have received evidence confirming that the other
party knows the secret.
Proof. (1) As we proved in Proposition 4.1, a complete run of Protocol I-A is defined the
the validation of macA and macB. Therefore, after a completed run of Protocol I-A, both
A and B have received and validated macB and macA respectively.
(2) macA is computed by A and takes the shared secret as one of the inputs. It is the
evidence confirming that A knows the shared secret.
(3) macB is computed by B and takes the shared secret as one of the inputs. It is the
evidence confirming that B knows the shared secret.
According to (1) and (2), after a completed run of Protocol I-A, B has received evidence
confirming A knows the shared secret. According to (1) and (3), after a completed run of
Protocol I-A, A has received evidence confirming B knows the shared secret. Therefore,
Protocol I-A provides key confirmation. Similarly we can prove that Protocol I-B provides
key confirmation.
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Proposition 4.5 (Known-key security (key freshness) of Protocol I-A and I-B). Assume
there is an attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages,
delay messages or delete messages transmitted between A and B via normal channels. In
addition, C is able to obtain any previous session keys. After a completed run of Protocol
I-A (or I-B), C is unable to derive the shared secret from the previous session keys.
Proof. In Protocol I-A, the computation of the secret takes the RA and RB as the inputs.
Since RA and RB are random values generated by A and B respectively in the key exchange
procedure, in each run of Protocol I-A the values are unique. Therefore, the secret is fresh in
each run of the protocol. That is, Protocol I-A provides known-key security (key freshness).
Similarly we can prove that Protocol I-B provides known-key security.
Proposition 4.6 (Forward secrecy of Protocol I-A and I-B). Assume there is an attacker
C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages
or delete messages transmitted between A and B via normal channels. In addition, C
compromises the long-term secrets of A and B. C is unable to derive the previous session
keys.
Proof. (1) According to the attack model, C obtains the following messages transmitted
via normal channels:
(E,G,Z∗q , A, UA, PKA, B, TB, PKB).
In addition, C compromises the long-term secrets PW and SKA and SKB.
(2) The values of RA and RB are short-term secrets. In practice, they will be cleared
after use. Therefore, for a previous run of the protocol, RA and RB are unknown to C. As
we proved in Theorem 4.2, RA or RB is required to compute the shared secret. Therefore,
C is unable to compute the secret of the previous run of the protocol.
Therefore, we have the conclusion that Protocol I-A provides forward secrecy. Similarly
we can prove that Protocol I-B provides forward secrecy.
Proposition 4.7 (Resistance to dictionary attacks of Protocol I-A and I-B). Assume there
is a passive attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages,
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delay messages or delete messages transmitted between A and B via normal channels. C
is unable to eliminate a significant number of possible passwords.
Proof. In Protocol I-A, the information that is related with the password is PKB = PKB+
Q(PW ) which is a point in the elliptic curve. A dictionary attack on the combination
of (PKB, PW ) (2
256 or more) is much difficult than directly guessing PW . Therefore,
Protocol I-A is resistant to dictionary attacks. Similarly, we can prove that Protocol I-B
is resistant to dictionary attacks.
4.3.2 Resistance to Attacks
The password UECDH-based AKE protocols address the vulnerabilities to the man-in-
the-middle attack and the impersonation attack. Below we illustrate how the two attacks
fail.
Resistance to the man-in-the-middle attack
Assume C is a man-in-the-middle attacker to Protocol I-A between A and B. To launch
the attack, C interacts with A and B as follows.
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q and computes
UA = RA + SKA.
Then A sends B M1 as follows:
A→ B : M1 = (A,UA, PKA).
2. C firstly intercepts M1.
Secondly, C generates a random value RC ∈ Z∗q and computes
UC = RC + SKC .
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At last, C sends a forged message (A,UC , PKC) to B, i.e.,
C → B : M ′1 = (A,UC , PKC)
3. Upon receiving the forged message M ′1, B firstly generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q ,
and computes
UB = RB + SKB,
TB = UB ×G,
PKB = PKB −Q(PW ).
Secondly, B computes the shared secret as follows:
T ′A = UC ×G,
KB = RB × (TA − PKC).
Thirdly, B computes a message authentication code macB as follows:
macB = MAC(KBx, B‖TB‖PKB).
Then B sends A M2 as follows:
B → A : M2 = (B, TB, PKB,macB)
4. C firstly intercepts M2.
Secondly, C computes
TC = UC ×G.
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Thirdly, C intends to compute a shared secret KCB = KB with B as follows:
KCB = RC × (TB − PKB),
PKB is hidden by Q(PW ) that is unknown by C. Therefore, C is unable to establish
a share secret with B.
Fourthly, C intends to compute a shared secret KCA = KA with A as follows:
KCA = RC × (UA ×G− PKA).
KA is computed by A from KA = RA × (TB − PKB). C can replace TB with TC in
this step; however, C is unable to replace PKB without PW . Therefore, C is unable
to establish a shared secret with A. The attack fails.
Therefore, Protocol I-A is resistant to the man-in-the-middle attack. Similarly, Protocol
I-B is resistant to the man-in-the-middle attack.
Resistance to the impersonation attack
Assume C is an impersonation attacker to Protocol I-A between A and B. To launch the
attack, C impersonates B and interacts with A as follows.
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q and computes
UA = RA + SKA.
Then A sends B M1 as follows:
A→ B : M1 = (A,UA, PKA).
2. C firstly intercepts and blocks M1.
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Table 4.1: Evaluation of computational costs of Protocol I-A, I-B and IEEE PW.
Computation Cost Cost on A Cost on B
Protocol I-A 2H+ S 2H+ 3S
Protocol I-B 2H+ 3S 2H+ S
IEEE PW 2H+ 2S 2H+ 2S
Secondly, C generates a random value RC ∈ Z∗q , and computes
TC = RC ×G+ PKB.
However, PKB is hidden by Q(PW ) in the protocol. Without PKB, C is unable
to computes a correct TC that makes KCA = RC × (UA × G − PKA) equals to
KA = RA × (TC − PKB). As a result, C is unable to compute a valid macB.
Without the valid macB, A terminates the protocol. The attack fails.
Therefore, Protocol I-A is resistant to the impersonation attack. Similarly, Protocol I-B is
resistant to the impersonation attack.
4.4 Performance
To study the performance of Protocol I-A and I-B, we choose the IEEE PW protocol
in IEEE 802.15.6 as the benchmark. We firstly theoretically evaluate and compare the
computational cost. Secondly, we realize prototypes of the protocols and carry out two
sets of experiment. The computational time is tested to observe the computational cost.
4.4.1 Evaluation
The computational cost is evaluated through the number of operations and algorithms
on A and B. Denote the cost of computing a scalar multiplication by S and the cost
of computing or verifying a MAC by H. Normally, S > H. The computational cost is
evaluated and compared in in Table 4.1. According to Table 4.1 we have the following
conclusions:
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• Conclusion 1: Protocol I-A reduces the computational cost on A compared with the
IEEE PW protocol;
• Conclusion 2: Protocol I-B reduces the computational cost on B compared with the
IEEE PW protocol;
• Conclusion 3: When A is a computationally limited device and B is much powerful
than A, the overall performance of Protocol I-A is better than that of the IEEE PW
protocol since it lets the powerful side undertake computational tasks on behalf of
the limited one. Similarly, when B is a limited device and A is a powerful one, the
overall performance of Protocol I-B is better than that of the IEEE PW protocol.
4.4.2 Experiments
We realize prototypes of Protocol I-A, I-B and the IEEE PW protocol using Python pro-
gramming language. The MAC algorithm is realized through HMAC with SHA-256. The
communication is realized through socket programming with TCP. Two sets of experiment
are carried out. In Experiment I-1, in order to observe how much computational cost that
Protocol I-A and I-B reduce on the initiator and the responder respectively, we use two
virtual machines with the same configuration to execute the protocols. In Experiment I-2,
in order to simulate two parties with different computational powers, we use a Raspberry
Pi and a laptop to execute the protocols.
Experiment I-1
The initiator A and the responder B are deployed on two virtual machines with the same
configuration (Table 4.2). We firstly run Protocol I-A and I-B with five elliptic curves
P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 for ten times. The average computational time is
illustrated in Figure 4.3 and 4.4. Secondly, we run Protocol I-A, I-B and the IEEE PW
protocol with the elliptic curve P-256 (the curve is recommended in IEEE 802.15.6) for ten
times. The average computational time is illustrated in Figure 4.5.
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Table 4.2: Experimental environment of Experiment I-1.
Party Operating System Base Memory Storage
A Ubuntu 16.04.3 (32-bit) 1024 MB 10 GB
B Ubuntu 16.04.3 (32-bit) 1024 MB 10 GB
Figure 4.3: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol I-A in Experiment I-1.
Figure 4.4: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol I-B in Experiment I-1.
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Figure 4.5: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol I-A, I-B and IEEE PW
in Experiment I-1.
Figure 4.3 and 4.4 show that for all of the five curves, Protocol I-A has significantly re-
duced computational time on A; and Protocol I-B has significantly reduced computational
time on B. According to Figure 4.5, the average computational time on A of Protocol I-A
is less than that of the IEEE PW prtocol; and the average computational time on B of
Protocol I-B is less than that of the IEEE PW protocol. This corresponds to the first two
conclusions in Section 4.4.1.
Experiment I-2
In Experiment I-2, we use a Raspberry Pi to simulate the computationally limited device,
and a laptop to simulate its powerful communicating partner. For Protocol I-A, we deploy
the initiator A on the Raspberry Pi and the responder B on the laptop. For Protocol I-B,
we deploy the initiator A on the laptop and the responder B on the Raspberry Pi. For
the IEEE PW protocol, the initiator is deployed on the Raspberry Pi and the responder is
deployed on the laptop. The experimental hardware platform is illustrated in Figure 4.6.
Details about the Raspberry Pi and the laptop are listed in Table 4.3.
We run Protocol I-A, I-B and the IEEE PW protocol with the elliptic curves P-256 ten
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Figure 4.6: Hardware platform of Experiment I-2.
Table 4.3: Experimental environment of Experiment I-2.
Experimental Device CPU Memory Hard Disk
Raspberry Pi 1.2 GMHz ARM 1 GB 32 GB
laptop 2.40 GHz i5-6200U 4 GB 120 GB
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Figure 4.7: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol I-A, I-B and IEEE PW
in Experiment I-2.
times. The average computational time is illustrated in Figure 4.7.
According to the Figure 4.7, the overall computational time of Protocol I-A and I-B are
less than that of IEEE PW. The experimental results corresponds to the third conclusion
in Section 4.4.1.
4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented two password UECDH-based AKE protocols. The two pro-
tocols achieve authentication through password and the MAC algorithm. The security of
the protocols was analyzed; and the resistance to the man-in-the-middle attack and the
impersonation attack was analyzed. To observe the performance of the two protocols, the
IEEE PW protocol in IEEE 802.15.6 was set as the benchmark. The performance of the
two protocols and the IEEE PW protocol was studied both through theoretical evaluation
and through two sets of experiment. The results show that the two password UECDH-
based AKE protocols reduce the computational time on the computationally limited device.
They are more suitable than the IEEE PW protocol in securing communications between
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two devices with different computation powers.
The password UECDH-based AKE protocols require the public key of the party un-
dertaking more computations to be hidden; otherwise, attackers can use the public key to
impersonate this party. This can lead to security issues in some cases. One example is
that the initiator (or the responder) needs to communicate with other parties in addition
to the responder (or the initiator). In this case, the other parties can acquire the public
key of the initiator (or responder); and the public key is no longer hidden (be only known
by two parties); therefore, security issues can occur. To overcome these limitations, in
the following chapter we will present two public key authenticated UECDH-based AKE
protocols that do not rely on hiding the public key.
Chapter 5
Public Key Authenticated
UECDH-based AKE Protocols
In Chapter 4 we explored how to remove man-in-the-middle and impersonation attacks
by hiding the public key and using password and MAC algorithms. The MAC algorithm
is used to authenticate the exchanged messages. The password is used to authenticate
the communicating parities and hide the public keys. The purpose of hiding the public
key is to prevent third parties from launching impersonation attacks. In cryptography,
a more conventional method for authentication is digital signature. It has wide applica-
tion in entity authentication and key establishment schemes and standards such as the
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) standard, the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) standard and so on.
In this chapter, we present two public key authenticated1 UECDH-based AKE pro-
tocols. By attaching the digital signatures to the exchanged messages, the two protocols
address the security issues of UECDH discussed in Chapter 3. Firstly, we provide an
overview of the communication model, attack model and security model of the protocol-
s. Secondly, we present the two public key authenticated UECDH-based AKE protocols:
1The word “authenticated” here means that the two communication parties possess the authenticate
public key of each other. This can be easily realized through Public Key Infrastructure (PKI); therefore,
we do not include this procedure in our protocols.
69
70 Jie Zhang
Protocol II-A which requires less scalar multiplications on A than on B, and Protocol II-B
which requires less scalar multiplication on B than A. Thirdly, we analyze the security
of the protocols according to the attack model and security model, and illustrate how the
man-in-the-middle and impersonation attacks to the protocols fail. At last, we study the
performance of the two protocols through theoretical evaluation and experimental test.
5.1 Overview
5.1.1 Communication Model
The communication model of a public key authenticated UECDH-based AKE protocol is
specified as follows.
• Participants. In each session of the protocol, there are two participants. The par-
ticipants are denoted by their identities A and B. A is the initiator, and B is the
responder. In particular, A and B have significantly different computation powers.
• Channels. The channels between A and B are normal channels.
5.1.2 Attack Model
We define the attack model of a public key authenticated UECDH-based AKE protocol
through the following assumptions and ability specifications:
• Basic assumption 1. The attacker is unable to break the digital signature algorithms.
• Basic assumption 2. The attacker is unable to break the MAC algorithms.
• Basic ability. The attacker is able to observe all messages, alter messages, insert
new messages, delay messages or delete messages transmitted via normal channels
between A and B.
• Stronger ability 1. The attacker is able to obtain any previous session key.
• Stronger ability 2. The attacker is able to compromise the long-term secret keys of
A and/or B.
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5.1.3 Security Model
Under the above attack model, a public key authenticated UECDH-based AKE protocol
desires to achieve the following security goals:
• Key authentication under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Key confidentiality under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Key integrity under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Key confirmation under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Known-key security (key freshness) under the attack model that the attacker has the
basic ability and the stronger ability 1.
• Forward secrecy under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability and
the stronger ability 2.
5.2 Protocol Description
5.2.1 Protocol II-A
Protocol II-A generates a shared secret for a computationally limited initiator A and a
more powerful responder B. It transfers one scalar multiplication from A to B. The
protocol is described through the following procedures: initialization, key exchange and
session keys computation. It is also illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Initialization
Before the execution of Protocol II-A, the initiator and the responder should obtain their
private and public keys respectively. The private keys should be integers in the same finite
field. The public keys should be points on the same elliptic curve. In addition, the initiator
and the responder should possess the public key of each other.
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Figure 5.1: Protocol II-A.
Chapter 5. Public Key Authenticated UECDH-based AKE Protocols 73
Denote the initiator by A, the responder by B, the finite field by Z∗q , the elliptic curve
by E, the base point of E by G, the private and public keys of A by SKA and PKA, and
the private and public keys of B by SKB and PKB. Formally, the initialization procedure
generates the following values:
• Common parameters shared by A and B: comm = (Z∗q , E,G, PKA, PKB).
• Secret information held only by A: SKA.
• Secret information held only by B: SKB.
Key Exchange
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UA = RA + SKA.
Then A sends B M1 as follows:
A→ B : M1 = (A,UA).
2. Upon receiving M1, B firstly generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q and computes TB
through the following two equations:
UB = RB + SKB,
TB = UB ×G.
Secondly, B computes the shared secret KB as follows:
TA = UA ×G,
KB = RB × (TA − PKA),
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Thirdly, B computes a digital signature σB as follows:
σB = SIGN(SKB, B‖TB‖KBx).
Finally, B sends A M2 as follows:
B → A : M2 = (B, TB, σB).
3. Upon receiving M2, A firstly computes the shared secret KA as follows:
KA = RA × (TB − PKB).
Secondly, A verifies σB as follows:
VERY(PKB, B‖TB‖KAx, σB) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Thirdly, if σB is valid, A computes a message authentication code macA as follows:
macA = MAC(KAx, A‖UA).
Finally, A sends B M3 as follows:
A→ B : M3 = macA
4. Upon receiving macA, B verifies macA as follows:
VER(KBx, A‖UA,macA) =
 1, valid0, invalid
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Session Keys Computation
If σB is valid, A derives the session keys from KAy as follows:
KENC = F(KAy, 1),
KMAC = F(KAy, 2).
If macA is valid, B derives the session keys from KBy as follows:
KENC = F(KBy, 1),
KMAC = F(KBy, 2).
5.2.2 Protocol II-B
Protocol II-B generates a shared secret for a powerful initiator A and a computationally
limited responder B. It transfers one scalar multiplication from B to A. We describe the
protocol through the following procedures: initialization, key exchange and session keys
computation in detail. In addition, we also illustrate the procedures in Figure 5.2.
Initialization
The initialization is the same with that of Protocol II-A. Let the notations A, B, Z∗q ,
E, G,SKA, PKA, SKB and PKB be the same as we specified in Section 5.2.1. The
initialization procedure produces the following values:
• Common parameters shared by A and B: comm = (Z∗q , E,G, PKA, PKB).
• Secret information held only by A: SKA.
• Secret information held only by B: SKB.
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Figure 5.2: Protocol II-B.
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Key Exchange
• A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q . A computes
UA = RA + SKA,
TA = UA ×G.
Then A sends B M1 as follows:
A→ B : M1 = (A, TA).
• Upon receiving M1, B firstly generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UB = RB + SKB.
Secondly, B computes the shared secret KB as follows:
KB = RB × (TA − PKA),
Thirdly, B computes a message authentication code macB as follows:
macB = MAC(KBx, B‖TB).
Finally, B sends A M2 as follows:
B → A : M2 = (B,UB,macB).
• Upon receiving M2, A firstly computes the shared secret KA as follows:
TB = UB ×G,
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KA = RA × (TB − PKB).
Secondly, A verifies macB as follows:
VER(KAx, B‖TB,macB) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Thirdly, if macB is valid, A computes a signature σA as follows:
σA = SIGN(SKA,KAx‖A‖TA).
Finally, A sends B M3 as follows:
A→ B : M3 = σA
• Upon receiving M3, B verifies σA as follows:
VERY(PKA,KBx‖A‖TA, σA) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Session Keys Computation
If macB is valid, A derives the session keys from KAy as follows:
KENC = F(KAy, 1),
KMAC = F(KAy, 2).
If σA is valid, B derives the session keys from KBy as follows:
KENC = F(KBy, 1),
KMAC = F(KBy, 2).
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5.3 Security
In this section we illustrate that the two public key authenticated UECDH-based AKE
protocols achieve the security goals (Section 5.1.3) under the attack model (Section 5.1.2).
For each security goal, we provide a proposition that states a security feature, and prove
how the proposition stands. In addition, we also show how the two protocols resist the
man-in-the-middle attack and the impersonation attack.
5.3.1 Security Features
Proposition 5.1 (Key authentication of Protocol II-A and II-B). Assume there is an
attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay mes-
sages or delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A and B. After a com-
pleted run of Protocol II-A (or II-B), A (or B) believes that he (or she) shares a secret
with B (or A) other than any other party.
Proof. (1) A completed run of Protocol II-A is defined by the validation of macA and
δB. The validation of macA guarantees the authenticity of UA; and the validation of δB
guarantees the authenticity of TB.
(2) A computes the shared secret fromKA = RA×(TB−PKB). RA is secretly generated
by A; PKB is pre-stored by A before the protocol; and TB is authenticated according to
(1). Therefore, after a completed run of Protocol II-A, A believes that he (or she) shares
a secret with B other than any other party.
(3) B computes the shared secret from KB = RB × (UA × G − PKA). RB is secretly
generated by B; PKA is pre-stored by B before the protocol; and UA is authenticated
according to (1). Therefore, after a completed run of Protocol II-A, B believes that he (or
she) shares a secret with A other than any other party.
According to (2) and (3), we have the conclusion that Protocol II-A provides key
authentication. Similarly we can prove that Protocol II-B provides key authentication.
Proposition 5.2 (Key confidentiality of Protocol II-A and II-B). Assume there is an
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attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay mes-
sages or delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A and B. After a com-
pleted run of Protocol II-A (or II-B), the attacker is unable to derive the shared key of A
and B.
Proof. (1) The shared secret can be computed from any of the following equations:
KA = RA × (TB − PKB),
KB = RB × (UA ×G− PKA),
K = RA ×RB ×G.
Therefore, RA or RB is required to compute the shared secret.
(2) RA is hidden by the following equation:
UA = RA + SKA.
Therefore, SKA is required to compute RA.
RB is hidden by the following equation:
TB = (RB + SKB)×G.
Therefore, SKB is required to compute RB.
(3) According to the attack model, C has neither SKA nor SKB. C is unable to
compute RA or RB. Therefore, C is unable to compute KA = KB = K.
Therefore, we have the conclusion that Protocol II-A provides key confidentiality. Sim-
ilarly we can prove that Protocol II-B provides key confidentiality.
Proposition 5.3 (Key integrity of Protocol II-A and II-B). Assume there is an attacker
C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages or
delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A and B. After a completed run
Chapter 5. Public Key Authenticated UECDH-based AKE Protocols 81
of Protocol II-A (or II-B), A and B computes the equal secret.
Proof. (1) As we proved in Theorem 5.1, a completed run of Protocol II-A implies the
authenticity of UA and TB.
(2) The secret KA is computed by A from
KA = RA × (TB − PKB)
= RA × (UB ×G− PKB)
= RA × ((RB + SKB)×G− PKB)
= RA ×RB ×G
The secret KB is computed by B from
KB = RB × (UA ×G− PKA)
= RB × ((RA + SKA)×G− PKA)
= RBRA ×G
= RA ×RB ×G
= KB.
Therefore, after a completed run of Protocol II-A, A and B compute the equal secret.
We have the conclusion that Protocol II-A provides key integrity. Similarly we can prove
that Protocol II-B provides key integrity.
Proposition 5.4 (Key confirmation of Protocol II-A and II-B). Assume there is an attack-
er C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages
or delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A and B. After a completed
run of Protocol II-A (or II-B), both A and B have receive evidence confirming that the
other party knows the secret.
Proof. (1) As we proved in Proposition 5.1, a completed run of Protocol II-A is defined the
validation of macA and δB. That is, A has received and validated δB; and B has received
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and validated macB.
(2) δB is generated by B and takes the shared secret as part of the inputs. It is the
evidence confirming that B knows the secret.
(3) macA is generated by A and take the shared secret as part of the inputs. It is the
evidence confirming that A knows the secret.
According to (1) and (2), after a completed run of Protocol II-A, A has received evidence
confirming that B knows the secret. According to (1) and (3), after a completed run of
Protocol II-A, B has received evidence confirming that A knows the secret. Therefore, we
have the conclusion that Protocol II-A provides key confirmation. Similarly we can prove
that Protocol II-B provides key confirmation.
Proposition 5.5 (Known-key security (key freshness) of Protocol II-A and II-B). Assume
there is an attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages,
delay messages or delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A and B. In
addition, C is able to obtain any previous session keys. After a completed run of Protocol
II-A (or II-B), C is unable to derive the shared secret from the previous session keys.
Proof. In Protocol II-A, the computation of the secret takes the RA and RB as the inputs.
Since RA and RB are random values generated by A and B respectively in the key exchange
procedure, in each run of Protocol II-A the values are unique. Therefore, the secret is
fresh in each run of the protocol. That is, Protocol II-A provides known-key security (key
freshness). Similarly we can prove that Protocol II-B provides known-key security.
Proposition 5.6 (Forward secrecy of Protocol II-A and II-B). Assume there is an attacker
C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages
or delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A and B. In addition, C
compromises the long-term secrets (i.e. the private keys) of A and B. C is unable to
derive the previous session keys of Protocol II-A or Protocol II-B.
Proof. As we proved in Theorem 5.2, RA or RB is required to compute the shared secret.
For a previous run of the protocol, the values of RA and RB are short-term secrets that
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are unknown to C. Therefore, C is unable to compute the secret of the previous run of
the protocol.
Therefore, we have the conclusion that Protocol II-A provides forward secrecy. Simi-
larly we can prove that Protocol II-B provides forward secrecy.
5.3.2 Resistance to Attacks
The public key authentication UECDH-based AKE protocols address the vulnerabilities
to the man-in-the-middle attack and the impersonation attack. Bellow we illustrate how
the two attacks fail.
Resistance to the man-in-the-middle attack
Assume C is a man-in-the-middle attacker to Protocol II-A between A and B. To launch
the attack, C interacts with A and B as follows.
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q and computes
UA = RA + SKA.
Then A sends B M1 as follows:
A→ B : M1 = (A,UA).
2. C firstly intercepts M1.
Secondly, C generates a random value RC ∈ Z∗q and computes
UC = RC + SKC .
At last, C sends a forged message (A,UC) to B, i.e.,
C → B : M ′1 = (A,UC).
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3. Upon receiving the forge message M ′1, B firstly generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q ,
and computes
UB = RB + SKB,
TB = UB ×G.
Secondly, B computes the shared secret KB as follows:
T ′A = UC ×G,
K ′B = RB × (T ′A − PKA).
Thirdly, B computes a digital signature σB as follows:
σB = SIGN(SKBx, B‖TB‖KBx).
Then B sends A with M2 as follows:
B → A : M2 = (B, TB, σB)
4. C firstly intercepts M2.
Secondly, C computes
TC = UC ×G.
Thirdly, C computes the shared secrets KCB and KCA as follows:
KCB = RC × (TB − PKB),
KCA = RC × (UA ×G− PKA).
– C is unable to forge a valid digital signature of B according to the basic as-
sumption 1.
Chapter 5. Public Key Authenticated UECDH-based AKE Protocols 85
– C is unable to compute equal keys withB orA sinceKCB 6= KB andKCA 6= KA.
Without the valid macA and σB, both B and A terminate the protocol. The attack
fails.
Therefore, Protocol II-A is resistant to the man-in-the-middle attack. Similarly, Protocol
II-B is resistant to the man-in-the-middle attack.
Resistance to the impersonation attack
Assume C is an impersonation attacker to Protocol II-A between A and B. To launch the
attack, C impersonates B and interacts with A as follows.
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q and computes
UA = RA + SKA.
Then A sends B M1 as follows:
A→ B : M1 = (A,UA).
2. C firstly intercepts and blocks M1.
Secondly, C generates a random value RC ∈ Z∗q , and computes
TC = RC ×G+ PKB.
Thirdly, C computes the shared secret KCA as follows:
TA = UA ×G,
K ′CA = RC × (TA − PKA).
86 Jie Zhang
Table 5.1: Comparison of computational cost.
Computational cost Cost on A Cost on B
Protocol II-A H+D + S H+D + 3S
Protocol II-B H+D + 3S H+D + S
TLS PK Authenticated 2D + 2S 2D + 2S
At this stage, C fails since he (or she) is unable to forge a valid digital signature of
B. Without the valid σB, A terminates the protocol. The attack fails.
Therefore, Protocol II-A is resistant to the impersonation attack. Similarly, Protocol II-B
is resistant to the impersonation attack.
5.4 Performance
To study the performance of Protocol II-A and Protocol II-B, we choose the TLS PK
Authenticated protocol as the benchmark. We firstly theoretically evaluate and compare
the computational cost. Secondly, we realize prototypes of the protocols and carry out two
sets of experiment. The computational time is tested to observe the computational cost.
5.4.1 Evaluation
Denote the cost of computing a scalar multiplication by S, the cost of computing or
verifying a MAC by H, the cost of computing or verifying a digital signature by D. The
computational cost is evaluated and compared in Table 5.1.
According to Table 5.1 we have the following conclusions:
• Conclusion 1: Protocol II-A reduces the computational cost on A compared with the
TLS PK Authenticated protocol;
• Conclusion 2: Protocol II-B reduces the computational cost on B compared with the
TLS PK Authenticated protocol;
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• Conclusion 3: When A is a computationally limited device, and B is much powerful
than A, the overall performance of Protocol II-A is better than that of the TLS
PK Authenticated protocol since it lets the powerful side undertake computational
tasks on behalf of the limited one. Similarly, when B is a limited device and A is
a powerful one, the overall performance of Protocol II-B is better than that of the
TLS PK Authenticated protocol.
5.4.2 Experiments
We realize prototypes of Protocol II-A, Protocol II-B and the TLS PK Authenticated
protocol using Python programming language. The MAC algorithm is realized through
HMAC with SHA-256. The digital signature is realized through ECDSA. The communica-
tion is realized through socket programming with TCP. Two sets of experiment are carried
out. In Experiment II-1, in order to observe how much computational cost that Protocol
II-A and Protocol II-B reduce on the initiator and the responder respectively, we use two
virtual machines with the same configuration to execute the protocols. In Experiment II-2,
in order to simulate two parties with different computational powers, we use a Raspberry
Pi and a laptop to execute the protocols.
Experiment II-1
The initiator A and the responder B are deployed on two virtual machines with the same
configuration (Table 5.2). We firstly run Protocol II-A and II-B with five elliptic curves
P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 for ten times. The average computational time is
illustrated in Figure 5.3 and 5.4. Secondly, we run Protocol II-A, II-B and the TLS PK
Authenticated protocol with the elliptic curve P-256 and P-384 (recommended in TLS 3.0)
for ten times. The average computational time is illustrated in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.3 and 5.4 show that for all of the five curves, Protocol II-A has less compu-
tational time on A than on B; and Protocol II-B has less computational time on B than
on A. According to Figure 5.5, the average computational time on A of Protocol II-A
is less than that of the TLS PK Authenticated protocol; and the average computational
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Table 5.2: Experimental environment of Experiment II-1.
Party Operating System Base Memory Storage
A Ubuntu 16.04.3 (32-bit) 1024 MB 10 GB
B Ubuntu 16.04.3 (32-bit) 1024 MB 10 GB
Figure 5.3: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol II-A in Experiment II-1.
Figure 5.4: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol II-B in Experiment II-1.
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Figure 5.5: Average computational time of A and B of Protocol II-A, Protocol II-B and
TLS PK Authenticated in Experiment II-1.
Table 5.3: Experimental environment of Experiment II-2.
Experimental Device CPU Memory Hard Disk
Raspberry Pi 1.2 GMHz ARM 1 GB 32 GB
laptop 2.40 GHz i5-6200U 4 GB 120 GB
time on B of Protocol II-B is less than that of the TLS PK Authenticated protocol. It is
corresponding to the first two conclusions in Section 5.4.1.
Experiment II-2
In Experiment II-2, we use a Raspberry Pi as the computationally limited device, and a
laptop as its powerful communicating partner. For Protocol II-A, we deploy the initiator
A on the Raspberry Pi and the responder B on the laptop. For Protocol II-B, we deploy
the initiator A on the laptop and the responder B on the Raspberry Pi. Details about the
Raspberry Pi and the laptop are listed in Table 5.3.
We run Protocol II-A, II-B and the TLS PK Authenticated protocol with the elliptic
curve P-256 for ten times. The average computational time is illustrated in Figure 5.6.
According to Figure 5.6, Protocol II-A and II-B are more friendly to the limited device
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Figure 5.6: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol II-A, Protocol II-B and
TLS PK Authenticated in Experiment II-2.
(Raspberry Pi); and the overall computational time of Protocol II-A and II-B are less than
that of the TLS PK Authenticated protocol. The experimental results are corresponding
to the third conclusion in Section 5.4.1.
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented two public key authenticated UECDH-based AKE protocols. Dig-
ital signature algorithms are used to achieve authentication. The protocols assume the
communicating parties have the authenticated public key of each other. Security of the
protocols was analyzed; and resistance to the man-in-the-middle and impersonation attack-
s was illustrated. Prototypes of the protocols and similar protocol in TLS were realized.
Based on the prototypes, two sets of of experiment were carried out to observe the per-
formance. The results show that the proposed protocols have successfully reduced the
computational cost on the limited party; and have lower over computational time than
similar protocol in TLS.
To use the digital signature algorithms, authenticated public keys between the com-
municating parties are required. This is often realized through Public Key Infrastructure
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(PKI). In PKI, a trusted center named Certificate Authority (CA) issues public keys for the
users. However, maintaining the public key certificates is complicated; and may overbur-
den the limited devices. In the following chapter, we will introduce another authentication
measure that does not rely on PKI.
Chapter 6
High Bandwidth OOB
UECDH-based AKE Protocols
In previous chapters we illustrated two different ways to remove attacks and achieve au-
thentication: 1) using a short pre-shared short secret, i.e., a password; and 2) issuing
authenticated public keys through trusted parties. Each of them has an applicable scenari-
o. However, there are scenarios where all the above methods are unsuitable. For example,
it is infeasible for two unacquainted devices to have a pre-shared secret; and moreover, if
the devices are computationally limited sensors, it is too expensive to apply PKI to issue
and maintain authenticated public keys. In this and the following chapter, we introduce a
different measure that neither requires pre-shared secret nor relies on PKI. That is, OOB
channels. The OOB channel is used to transmit authenticated messages in security pro-
tocols since it is not vulnerable to attacks. Such protocols are popular in recent years.
International standards such as Bluetooth 5.0 and IEEE 802.15.6 include OOB channel
based security protocols.
In this chapter, we introduce UECDH-based AKE protocols with high bandwidth OOB
channels that are capable of transmiting long strings. Examples of such channels are emails,
QR codes, human body channels and so on. We firstly provide an overview of the protocols
in terms of the communication model, attack model and security model. Secondly, we
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describe the protocols: Protocol III-A which requires less scalar multiplications on A than
on B, and Protocol III-B which requires less scalar multiplications on B than A. Thirdly,
we analyze the security of the protocols according to the attack and security models;
in particular, we discuss how the protocols resist the man-in-the-middle attack and the
impersonation attack. Finally, prototypes of the protocols are realized. We evaluate the
performance of the protocols through theoretical evaluation and experiments.
6.1 Overview
6.1.1 Communication Model
The communication model of a high bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocol is
specified as follows.
• Participants. In each session of the protocol, there are two participants. The par-
ticipants are denoted by their identities A and B. A is the initiator, and B is the
responder. In particular, A and B have significantly different computational capa-
bilities.
• Channels. The channels between A and B include normal channels and high band-
width OOB channels.
6.1.2 Attack Model
The following assumptions and attack model specify what an attacker to a high bandwidth
OOB UECDH-based AKE protocol is able and unable to do.
• Basic assumption 1. The attacker is unable to alter, insert, delay or delete messages
transmitted in the OOB channel.
• Basic assumption 2. The attacker is unable to break the MAC algorithms.
• Basic ability. The attacker is able to observe all messages, alter messages, insert new
messages, delay messages or delete messages transmitted between A and B.
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• Stronger ability 1. The attacker is able to obtain any previous session key.
• Stronger ability 2. The attacker is able to compromise the long-term secret keys of
A and/or B.
6.1.3 Security Model
Under the above attack model, a high bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocol aims
to achieve the following security goals:
• Key authentication under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Key confidentiality under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Key integrity under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Key confirmation under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Known-key security (key freshness) under the attack model that the attacker has the
basic ability and the stronger ability 1.
• Forward secrecy under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability and
the stronger ability 2.
6.2 Protocol Description
6.2.1 Protocol III-A
Protocol III-A shares a secret between a computationally limited initiator A and a more
powerful responder B. It transfers one scalar multiplication from A to B. The protocol is
described through the following procedures: initialization, key exchange and session keys
computation. It is also illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Chapter 6. High Bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE Protocols 95
Figure 6.1: Protocol III-A.
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Initialization
Before the execution of Protocol III-A, the initiator and the responder shall obtain their
private and public keys respectively. The private keys should be integers in the same finite
field. The public keys should be points on the same elliptic curve.
Denote the initiator by A, the responder by B, the finite field by Z∗q , the elliptic curve
by E, the base point of E by G, the private and public keys of A by SKA and PKA, and
the private and public keys of B by SKB and PKB. Formally, the initialization procedure
generates the following values:
• Common parameters shared by A and B: comm = (Z∗q , E,G).
• Information held only by A: SKA and PKA where SKA should be securely stored.
• Information held only by B: SKB, PKB where SKB should be securely stored.
Key Exchange
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UA = RA + SKA.
Then A sends B M1 through a high-bandwidth OOB channel as follows:
A⇒h B : M1 = (A,PKA, UA).
2. Upon receiving M1, B firstly generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q and computes TB
through the following two equations:
UB = RB + SKB,
TB = UB ×G.
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Then B sends A with M2 through a high-bandwidth OOB channel as follows:
B ⇒h B : M2 = (B,PKB, TB).
3. Upon receiving M2, A firstly computes the shared secret KA as follows:
KA = RA × (TB − PKB).
Secondly, A computes a message authentication code macA as follows:
macA = MAC(KAx, A‖PKA‖UA).
Finally, A sends B M3 through a normal channel as follows:
A→ B : M3 = macA.
4. Upon receiving M3, B firstly computes the shared secret KB as follows:
TA = UA ×G,
KB = RB × (TA − PKA).
Secondly, B verifies macA as follows:
VER(KBx, A‖PKA‖UA,macA) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Thirdly, if macA is valid, B computes macB as follows:
macB = MAC(KBx, B‖PKB‖TB).
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Finally, B sends A M4 through a normal channel as follows:
B → A : M4 = macB.
5. Upon receiving M4, A verifies macB as follows:
VER(KAx, B‖PKB‖TB,macB) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Session Keys Computation
If macB is valid, A derives the session keys from KAy as follows:
KENC = F(KAy, 1),
KMAC = F(KAy, 2).
If macA is valid, B derives the session keys from KBy as follows:
KENC = F(KBy, 1),
KMAC = F(KBy, 2).
6.2.2 Protocol III-B
Protocol III-B shares a secret between a powerful initiator A and a computationally lim-
ited responder B. It transfers one scalar multiplication from B to A. We describe the
protocol through the following procedures: initialization, key exchange and session keys
computation in detail. In addition, we also illustrate the procedures through Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: Protocol III-B.
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Initialization
The initialization here is similar with that of Protocol III-A. Let the notations A, B, Z∗q ,
E, G, SKA, PKA, SKB and PKB be the same as we specified in Section 6.2.1. The
initialization procedure produces the following values:
• Common parameters shared by A and B: comm = (Z∗q , E,G).
• Information held only by A: SKA and PKA where SKA is securely stored.
• Information held only by B: SKB and PKB where SKB is securely stored.
Key Exchange
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q and computes
UA = RA + SKA,
TA = UA ×G.
Then A sends B M1 through a high-bandwidth OOB channel as follows:
A⇒h B : M1 = (A,PKA, TA).
2. Upon receiving M1, B firstly generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UB = RB + SKB.
Then B sends A M2 through a high-bandwidth OOB channel as follows:
B ⇒h: A : M2 = (B,PKB, UB).
Chapter 6. High Bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE Protocols 101
3. Upon receiving M2, A firstly computes the shared secret KA as follows:
TB = UB ×G,
KA = RA × (TB − PKB).
Secondly, A computes a message authentication code macA as follows:
macA = MAC(KAx,A‖PKA‖TA).
Finally, A sends B M3 through a normal channel as follows:
A→ B : M3 = macA.
4. Upon receiving M3, B firstly computes the shared secret KB as follows:
KB = RB × (TA − PKA).
Secondly, B verifies macA as follows:
VER(KBx, A‖PKA‖TA,macA) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Thirdly, if macB is valid, B computes a message authentication code macB as follows:
macB = MAC(KBx, B‖PKB‖UB).
Finally, B sends A M4 through a normal channel as follows:
B → A : M4 = macB.
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5. Upon receiving M4, A verifies macB as follows:
VER(KAx, B‖PKB‖UB,macB) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Session Keys Computation
If macB is valid, A derives the session keys from KAy as follows:
KENC = F(KAy, 1),
KMAC = F(KAy, 2).
If macA is valid, B derives the session keys from KBy as follows:
KENC = F(KBy, 1),
KMAC = F(KBy, 2).
6.3 Security
This section illustrates that the two high bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocols
achieve the security goals (Section 6.1.3) under the attack model (Section 6.1.2). For each
security goal, we provide a proposition that states a security feature, and prove how the
proposition stands. In addition, we also show how the two protocols resist the man-in-the-
middle attack and the impersonation attack.
6.3.1 Security Features
Proposition 6.1 (Key authentication of Protocol III-A and III-B). Assume there is an
attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay mes-
sages or delete messages transmitted via the normal channels between A and B. After a
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completed run of Protocol III-A (or III-B), A (or B) believes that he (or she) shares a
secret with B (or A) other than any other party.
Proof. (1) According to the basic assumption 1, messages transmitted via the OOB chan-
nels are authenticated. Therefore, in Protocol III-A, PKA, UA, PKB and TB are authen-
ticated.
(2) A computes the secret KA from the following equation:
KA = RA × (TB − PKB).
RA is generated by A; and TB and PKB are authenticated according to (1). Therefore,
A believes that he (or she) shares a secret with B.
(3) B computes the secret KB from the following equation:
KB = RB × (UA ×G− PKA).
RB is generated by B; UA and PKA are authenticated according to (1). Therefore, B
believes that he (or she) shares a secret with A.
According to (2) and (3), Protocol III-A provides key authentication under the basic
assumptions and the attack model that C has the basic ability. Similarly, we can prove
that Protocol III-B provides key authentication under the basic assumptions and the attack
model that C has the basic ability.
Proposition 6.2 (Key confidentiality of Protocol III-A and III-B). Assume there is an
attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay mes-
sages or delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A and B. After a com-
pleted run of Protocol III-A (or III-B), the attacker is unable to derive the shared key of
A and B.
Proof. (1) The shared secret can be computed from any of the following equations:
KA = RA × (TB − PKB),
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KB = RB × (UA ×G− PKA),
K = RA ×RB ×G.
Therefore, RA or RB is required to compute the shared secret.
(2) RA is hidden by the following equation:
UA = RA + SKA.
Therefore, SKA is required to compute RA.
RB is hidden by the following equation:
TB = (RB + SKB)×G.
Therefore, SKB is required to compute RB.
According to the attack model, C has neither SKA nor SKB. C is unable to compute
RA or RB. As a result, C is unable to compute KA = KB = K. Therefore, we have the
conclusion that Protocol III-A provides key confidentiality. Similarly we can prove that
Protocol III-B provides key confidentiality.
Proposition 6.3 (Key integrity of Protocol III-A and III-B). Assume there is an attacker
C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages or
delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A and B. After a completed run
of Protocol III-A (or III-B), A and B compute the equal secret.
Proof. (1) As we proved in Theorem 6.1, PKA, UA, PKB and UB are authenticated.
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(2) The secret KA is computed by A from
KA = RA × (TB − PKB)
= RA × (UB ×G− PKB)
= RA × ((RB + SKB)×G− PKB)
= RA ×RB ×G.
The secret KB is computed by B from
KB = RB × (UA ×G− PKA)
= RB × ((RA + SKA)×G− PKA)
= RBRA ×G
= RA ×RB ×G
= KA
Therefore, we have the conclusion that Protocol III-A provides key integrity. Similarly
we can prove that Protocol III-B provides key integrity.
Proposition 6.4 (Key confirmation of Protocol III-A and III-B). Assume there is an
attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay mes-
sages or delete messages transmitted via normal channel between A and B. After a com-
pleted run of Protocol III-A (or III-B), both A and B have received evidence confirming
that the other party knows the secret.
Proof. (1) A completed run of Protocol III-A is defined by the validation of macA and
macB. Therefore, after a completed run of Protocol III-A, both A and B have received
and validated macA and macB.
(2) macA is computed by A and takes the shared secret as one of the inputs. It is the
evidence confirming that A knows the secret.
(3) macB is computed by B and takes the shared secret as one of the inputs. It is the
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evidence confirming that B knows the secret.
According to (1) and (2), after a completed run of Protocol III-A, B has received the
evidence confirming that A knows the secret. According to (1) and (3), after a completed
run of Protocol III-A, A has received the evidence confirming that B knows the secret.
Therefore, we have the conclusion that Protocol III-A provides key confirmation. Similarly
we can prove that Protocol III-B provides key confirmation.
Proposition 6.5 (Known-key security (key freshness) of Protocol III-A and III-B). As-
sume there is an attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new
messages, delay messages or delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A
and B. In addition, C is able to obtain any previous session keys. After a completed run of
Protocol III-A (or III-B), C is unable to derive the shared secret from the previous session
keys.
Proof. In Protocol III-A, the computation of the secret takes the RA and RB as the inputs.
Since RA and RB are random values generated by A and B respectively in the key exchange
procedure, in each run of Protocol III-A the values are unique. Therefore, the secret is
fresh in each run of the protocol. That is, Protocol III-A provides known-key security (key
freshness). Similarly we can prove that Protocol III-B provides known-key security.
Proposition 6.6 (Forward secrecy of Protocol III-A and III-B). Assume there is an attack-
er C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages
or delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A and B. In addition, C
compromises the long-term secrets of A and B. C is unable to derive the previous session
keys.
Proof. (1) In Protocol III-A, C obtains the following information:
(E,G,Z∗q , A,B).
In addition, C compromises the SKA and SKB.
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(2) The values of RA and RB are short-term secrets. In practice, they are cleared after
use. For a previous run of the protocol, RA and RB are are unknown to C. As we proved
in Theorem 6.2, RA or RB is required to compute the shared secret. Therefore, C is unable
to compute the secret of the previous run of the protocol.
Therefore, we have the conclusion that Protocol III-A provides forward secrecy. Simi-
larly we can prove that Protocol III-B provides forward secrecy.
6.3.2 Resistance to Attacks
The high bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocols address the vulnerabilities to the
man-in-the-middle attack and the impersonation attack. Bellow we illustrate how the two
attacks fail.
Resistance to the man-in-the-middle attack
Assume C is a man-in-the-middle attacker to Protocol III-A between A and B. To launch
the attack, C interacts with A and B as follows.
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q and computes
UA = RA + SKA.
Then A sends B M1 via a high bandwidth OOB channel as follows:
A⇒ B : M1 = (A,PKA, UA).
2. To launch a man-in-the-middle attack, C intends to intercept and replace M1. How-
ever, since M1 is transmitted through OOB channel, C is unable to block M1 and
insert his (or her) messages. The man-in-the-middle attack fails.
Therefore, Protocol III-A is resistant to the man-in-the-middle attack. Similarly, Protocol
III-B is resistant to the man-in-the-middle attack.
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Resistance to the impersonation attack
Assume C is an impersonation attacker to Protocol III-A between A and B. To launch
the attack, C impersonates B and interacts with A as follows.
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q and computes
UA = RA + SKA.
Then A sends B M1 as follows:
A→ B : M1 = (A,UA).
2. C intends to block and replace M1. However, as M1 is transmitted via OOB channels
between A and B, C is unable to block and replace the message. The impersonation
attack fails.
Therefore, Protocol III-A is resistant to the impersonation attack. Similarly, Protocol III-B
is resistant to the impersonation attack.
6.4 Performance
To study the performance of Protocol III-A and III-B, we choose the Bluetooth OOB pro-
tocol as the benchmark. We firstly theoretically evaluate and compare the computational
cost. Secondly, we realize prototypes of the protocols and carry out two sets of experiment.
The computational time is tested to observe the computational cost.
6.4.1 Evaluation
Denote the cost of computing a scalar multiplication by S and the cost of computing or
verifying a MAC by H. The computational cost is evaluated in Table 6.1. According to
Table 6.1 we have the following conclusions:
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Table 6.1: Evaluation of computational costs of Protocol III-A, III-B and Bluetooth OOB.
Computation Cost Cost on A Cost on B
Protocol III-A 2H+ S 2H+ 3S
Protocol III-B 2H+ 3S 2H+ S
Bluetooth OOB 4H+ 2S 4H+ 2S
• Conclusion 1: Protocol III-A reduces the computational cost on A compared with
the Bluetooth OOB protocol;
• Conclusion 2: Protocol III-B reduces the computational cost on B compared with
the Bluetooth OOB protocol;
• Conclusion 3: When A is a computationally limited device and B is much powerful
than A, the overall performance of Protocol III-A is better than that of the Bluetooth
OOB protocol since it lets the powerful side undertake computational tasks on behalf
of the limited one. Similarly, when B is a limited device and A is a powerful one,
the overall performance of Protocol III-B is better than that of the Bluetooth OOB
protocol.
6.4.2 Experiments
We realize prototypes of Protocol III-A, III-B and the Bluetooth OOB protocol using
Python programming language. The MAC algorithm is realized through HMAC with
SHA-256. The communication is realized through socket programming with TCP. Two
sets of experiment are carried out. In Experiment III-1, in order to observe how much
computational cost that Protocol III-A and III-B reduce on the initiator and the respon-
der respectively, we use two virtual machines with the same configuration to execute the
protocols. In Experiment III-2, in order to simulate two parties with different computa-
tional powers, we use a Raspberry Pi and a laptop to execute the protocols.
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Table 6.2: Experimental environment of Experiment III-1.
Party Operating System Base Memory Storage
A Ubuntu 16.04.3 (32-bit) 1024 MB 10 GB
B Ubuntu 16.04.3 (32-bit) 1024 MB 10 GB
Figure 6.3: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol III-A in Experiment III-1.
Experiment III-1
The initiator A and the responder B are deployed on two virtual machines with the same
configuration (Table 6.2). We firstly run Protocol III-A and III-B with five elliptic curves
P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 for ten times. The average computational time is
illustrated in Figure 6.3 and 6.4. Secondly, we run Protocol III-A, III-B and Bluetooth
OOB with the elliptic curve P-256 for ten times. The average computational time is
illustrated in Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.3 and 6.4 show that for all of the five curves, Protocol III-A requires less
computational time on A than on B; and Protocol III-B requires less computational time
on B than on A. According to Figure 6.5, the average computational time on A of Protocol
III-A is less than that of the Bluetooth OOB protocol; and the average computational time
on B of Protocol III-B is less than that of the Bluetooth OOB protocol. It is corresponding
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Figure 6.4: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol III-B in Experiment III-1.
Figure 6.5: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol III-A, III-B and the
Bluethooth OOB protocol in Experiment III-1.
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Table 6.3: Experimental environment of Experiment III-2.
Experimental Device CPU Memory Hard Disk
Raspberry Pi 1.2 GMHz ARM 1 GB 32 GB
laptop 2.40 GHz i5-6200U 4 GB 120 GB
Figure 6.6: Average computational time of A and B of Protocol III-A, III-B and the
Bluetooth OOB protocol in Experiment III-2.
to the first two conclusions in Section 6.4.1.
Experiment III-2
In Experiment III-2, we use a Raspberry Pi as the computationally limited device, and a
laptop as its powerful communicating partner. For Protocol III-A, we deploy the initiator
A on the Raspberry Pi and the responder B on the laptop. For Protocol III-B, we deploy
the initiator A on the laptop and the responder B on the Raspberry Pi. Details about the
Raspberry Pi and the laptop are listed in Table 6.3.
We run Protocol III-A, III-B and the Bluetooth OOB protocol with the elliptic curve
P-256 for ten times. The average computational time is illustrated in Figure 6.6.
According to the Figure 6.6, Protocol III-A and III-B are more friendly to the limited
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device (Raspberry Pi); and the overall computational time of Protocol III-A and III-B are
less than that of Bluetooth OOB. The experimental results are corresponding the third
conclusion in Section 6.4.1.
6.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented two UECDH-based AKE protocols that use high bandwidth OOB
channels. The two protocols remove attacks to the UECDH key exchange scheme through
transmitting authenticated messages via high bandwidth OOB channels. The security of
the protocols was analyzed; and the resistance to the man-in-the-middle attack and the
impersonation attack was analyzed. To observe the performance of the two protocols,
the OOB channel based authentication protocol in Bluetooth 5.0 standard was set as
the benchmark. The performance of the two protocols and the Bluetooth OOB protocol
was studied both through theoretical evaluation and through two sets of experiments.
The results show that the two high bandwidth OOB UECDH-based protocols reduce the
computational time on the computationally limited device. They are more suitable than the
Bluetooth OOB protocol in securing communications between two devices with different
computational capabilities.
The proposed protocols transmit long strings (including the public keys) via OOB
channels. This requires the two communicating devices can establish high bandwidth OOB
channels. In some cases, the communicating devices can only establish low bandwidth OOB
channels that are incapable of transmitting long strings. For example, both devices have a
small display. In the following chapter, we will illustrate how to design UECDH-based AKE
protocols with low bandwidth OOB channels, in particular, the display OOB channels.
Chapter 7
Low Bandwidth OOB
UECDH-based AKE Protocols
In Chapter 6 we proposed UECDH-based AKE protocols that utilize high bandwidth OOB
channels to transmit authenticated messages. In practice, there are a number of devices
that are incapable of establishing high bandwidth OOB channels. In this chapter, we will
introduce protocols using short bandwidth OOB channels, for example, the display OOB
channels. Low bandwidth OOB channels are used by the user to compare an authentica-
tion number computed by the communicating devices. The number is usually a five-digit
number which is the positive decimal integer converted from a digest string (i.e., the 16
bit output of MAC). Short hash functions such as the a MAC with 16 bit output usually
do not resist combinational attacks. Therefore, the commitment mechanism is utilized in
designing low bandwidth OOB UECHD-based protocols. It forces the parities to be (joint-
ly) committed to the digest before knowing what it is until they reveal their respective
shares. As a result, combinatorial search attacks such as the birthday attacks fail. Low
bandwidth OOB channels are popular in recent years, especially in designing authentica-
tion protocols between IoT devices. The international standards IEEE 802.15.6 includes a
display authenticated association protocol; and the Bluetooth 5.0 also includes a numeric
comparison authentication protocol that is based on display OOB channels.
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In the remaining parts of this chapter, we firstly provide an overview of the protocols
in terms of the communication model, attack model and security model. Secondly, we
describe the low bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocols: Protocol IV-A which
requires less scalar multiplications on A than on B, and Protocol IV-B which requires
less scalar multiplications on B than A. Thirdly, we analyze the security of the protocols
according the attack and security models; in particular, we discuss how the protocols resist
the man-in-the-middle attack and the impersonation attack. Finally, the IEEE Display
protocol and the Bluetooth Display protocol are chosen as the benchmarks; prototypes of
Protocol IV-A, IV-B and the benchmark protocols are realized. We evaluate and compare
the performance of the protocols through theoretical evaluation and experiments.
7.1 Overview
7.1.1 Communication Model
The communication model of a low bandwidth OOB UECDH-based protocol is specified
as follows.
• Participants. In each session of the protocol, there are two participants. The par-
ticipants are denoted by their identities A and B. A is the initiator, and B is the
responder. In particular, A and B have significantly different computational capa-
bilities.
• Channels. The channels between A and B include normal channels and low band-
width OOB channels, for example, the display OOB channels.
7.1.2 Attack Model
The following assumptions and attack model specify what an attacker to a low bandwidth
OOB UECDH-based AKE protocol is able and unable to do.
• Basic assumption 1. The attacker is unable to alter, insert, delay or delete messages
transmitted in the OOB channel.
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• Basic assumption 2. The attacker is unable to break the MAC algorithms.
• Basic ability. The attacker is able to observe all messages, alter messages, insert
new messages, delay messages or delete messages transmitted via normal channels
between A and B.
• Stronger ability 1. The attacker is able to obtain any previous session key.
• Stronger ability 2. The attacker is able to compromise the long-term secret keys of
A or B.
7.1.3 Security Model
Under the above attack model, a low bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocol aims
to achieve the following security goals:
• Key authentication under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Key confidentiality under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Key integrity under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Key confirmation under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability.
• Known-key security (key freshness) under the attack model that the attacker has the
basic ability and the stronger ability 1.
• Forward secrecy under the attack model that the attacker has the basic ability and
the stronger ability 2.
• Resistance to combinatorial attacks under the attack model that the attacker has the
basic ability.
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7.2 Protocol Description
7.2.1 Protocol IV-A
Protocol IV-A shares a secret between a computationally limited initiator A and more
powerful responder B. It transfers one scalar multiplication from A to B. The protocol is
described through the following procedures: initialization, key exchange and session keys
computation. It is also illustrated in Figure 7.1.
Initialization
Before the execution of Protocol IV-A, the initiator and the responder shall obtain their
private and public keys respectively. The private keys should be integers in the same finite
field. The public keys should be points on the same elliptic curve.
Denote the initiator by A, the responder by B, the finite field by Z∗q , the elliptic curve
by E, the base point of E by G, the private and public keys of A by SKA and PKA, and
the private and public keys of B by SKB and PKB. Formally, the initialization procedure
generates the following values:
• Common parameters shared by A and B: comm = (Z∗q , E,G).
• Information held only by A: PKA and SKA where SKA should be securely stored.
• Information held only by B: PKB and SKB where SKB should be securely stored.
Key Exchange
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q and computes
UA = RA + SKA,
commitA = MAC(UA, A‖PKA)
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Figure 7.1: Protocol IV-A.
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Then A sends B M1 via a normal channel as follows:
A→ B : M1 = (A,PKA, commitA).
2. Upon receiving M1, B generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UB = RB + SKB,
TB = UB ×G,
commitB = MAC(TB, B‖PKB).
Then B sends A M2 via a normal channel as follows:
B → A : M2 = (B,PKB, commitB)
3. Upon receiving M2, A sends B M3 via a normal channel as follows
A→ B : M3 = UA.
4. Upon receiving M3, B firstly verifies commitA.
Equal(MAC(UA, A‖PKA), commitA) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Secondly, if commitA is valid, B sends A M4 via a normal channel as follows:
B → A : M4 = TB.
Thirdly, B computes the shared secret KB as follows:
TA = UA ×G,
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KB = RB × (TA − PKA).
Finally, B computes a digest as follows and shows it on the display:
digestB = MAC16(KBx, A‖B‖PKA‖PKB‖UA‖TB).
5. Upon receiving M4, A firstly verifies commitB as follows:
Equal(MAC(TB, B‖PKB), commitB) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Secondly, if commitB is valid, A computes the shared secret KA as follows:
KA = RA × (TB − PKB).
Finally, A computes a digest digest as follows and shows it on the display:
digestA = MAC16(KAx, A‖B‖PKA‖PKB‖UA‖TB).
6. A and B compares the digests.
Session Keys Computation
If digestA = digestB, A derives the session keys from KAy as follows:
KENC = F(KAy, 1),
KMAC = F(KAy, 2).
B derives the session keys from KBy as follows:
KENC = F(KBy, 1),
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KMAC = F(KBy, 2).
7.2.2 Protocol IV-B
Protocol IV-B shares a secret between a powerful initiator A and a computationally lim-
ited responder B. It transfers one scalar multiplication from B to A. We describe the
protocol through the following procedures: initialization, key exchange and session keys
computation in detail. In addition, we also illustrate the procedures through Figure 7.2.
Initialization
The initialization here is similar with that of Protocol IV-A. Let the notations A, B, Z∗q ,
E, G, SKA, PKA, SKB and PKB be the same as we specified in Section 6.2.1. The
initialization procedure produces the following values:
• Common parameters shared by A and B: comm = (Z∗q , E,G).
• Information held only by A: (PKA, SKA) where SKA should be secretly stored.
• Information held only by B: (PKB, SKB) where SKB should be secretly stored.
Key Exchange
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q and computes
UA = RA + SKA,
TA = UA ×G,
commitA = MAC(TA, A‖PKA).
Then A sends B M1 via a normal channel as follows:
A→ B : M1 = (A,PKA, commitA).
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Figure 7.2: Protocol IV-B.
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2. Upon receiving M1, B generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q , and computes
UB = RB + SKB.
commitB = MAC(UB, B‖PKB).
Then B sends A M2 via a normal channel as follows:
B → A : M2 = (B,PKB, commitB).
3. Upon receiving M2, A sends B M3, i.e. TA via a normal channel.
A→ B : M2 = TA.
4. Upon receiving M3, B verifies commitA as follows:
Equal(MAC(UA, A‖PKA), commitA) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Secondly, if commitA is valid, B sends A M4, i.e. UB via a normal channel.
B → A : M4 = UB.
Thirdly, B computes the shared secret KB as follows
KB = RB × (TA − PKA).
Finally, B computes a digest as follows and shows it on the display:
digestB = MAC16(KBx, A‖B‖PKA‖PKB‖TA‖UB).
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5. Upon receiving M4, A firstly verifies commitB as follows
Equal(MAC(UB, B‖PKB), commitB) =
 1, valid0, invalid
Secondly, if commitB is valid, A computes the shared secret KA as follows
TB = UB ×G,
KA = RA × (TB − PKB).
Finally, A computes a digest digestA as follows and shows it on the display:
digestA = MAC16(KAx, A‖B‖PKA‖PKB‖TA‖UB)
6. A and B compares the digests.
Session Keys Computation
If digestA = digestB, A derives the session keys from KAy as follows:
KENC = F(KAy, 1),
KMAC = F(KAy, 2).
B derives the session keys from KBy as follows:
KENC = F(KBy, 1),
KMAC = F(KBy, 2).
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7.3 Security
This section illustrates that the two low bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocols
achieve the security goals (Section 7.1.3) under the attack model (Section 7.1.2). For each
security goal, we provide a proposition that states a security feature, and prove how the
proposition stands. In addition, we also show how the two protocols resist the man-in-the-
middle attack and the impersonation attack.
7.3.1 Security Features
Proposition 7.1 (Key authentication of Protocol IV-A and IV-B). Assume there is an
attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay mes-
sages or delete messages transmitted via the normal channels between A and B. After a
completed run of Protocol IV-A (or IV-B), A (or B) believes that he (or she) shares a
secret B (or A) other than any other party.
Proof. (1) A completed run of Protocol IV-A is defined by the equality of digestA and
digestB; and the validation of commitA and commitB is the preconditions to comparing
digestA and digestB. Therefore, after a completed run of Protocol IV-A, commitA and
commitB are validated.
(2) Since commitA = MAC(A,PKA, UA), the validation of commitA guarantees the
authenticity of PKA and UA. Similarly, the validation of commitB guarantees the authen-
ticity of PKB and TB. Therefore, after a completed run of Protocol IV-A, PKA, UA, PKB
and TB are authenticated.
(3) Since KA = RA × (TB − PKB), RA is generated by A and TB and PKB are
authenticated according to (2), A believes that KA is the shared secret B other than any
other party.
(4) Since KB = RB × (UA × G − PKA), RB is generated by B and UA and PKA are
authenticated according to (2), B believes that KB is the shared secret A other than any
other party.
According to (3) and (4), Protocol IV-A provides key authentication under the basic
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assumptions and the attack model that C has the basic ability. Similarly we can prove
that Protocol IV-B provides key authentication under the basic assumptions and the attack
model that C has the basic ability.
Proposition 7.2 (Key confidentiality of Protocol IV-A and IV-B). Assume there is an
attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay mes-
sages or delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A and B. After a com-
pleted run of Protocol IV-A (or IV-B), the attacker is unable to derive the shared key of A
and B.
Proof. (1) The shared secret can be computed from any of the following equations:
KA = RA × (TB − PKB),
KB = RB × (UA ×G− PKA),
K = RARB ×G.
Therefore, RA or RB is required to compute the shared secret.
(2) Since RA is hidden by the following equation:
UA = RA + SKA,
SKA is required to compute RA.
Since RB is hidden by the following equation:
TB = (RB + SKB)×G,
SKB is required to compute RB.
(3) According to the attack model, C has neither SKA nor SKB. C is unable to
compute RA or RB. Therefore, C is unable to compute KA = KB = K.
According to (3), we have the conclusion that Protocol IV-A provides key confidentiality
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under the basic assumptions and the attack model that C has the basic ability. Similarly
we can prove that Protocol IV-B provides key confidentiality under the basic assumptions
and the attack model that C has the basic ability.
Proposition 7.3 (Key integrity of Protocol IV-A and IV-B). Assume there is an attacker
C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages or
delete messages transmitted via normal channel between A and B. After a completed run
of Protocol IV-A (or IV-B), A and B computes the equal secret.
Proof. (1) As we proved in Proposition 7.1, a completed run of Protocol IV-A (or IV-B)
implies authenticity of TB, PKB, UA and PKA.
(2) The secret KA is computed by A from
KA = RA × (TB − PKB)
= RA × (UB ×G− PKB)
= RA × ((RB + SKB)×G− PKB)
= RA ×RB ×G.
The secret KB is computed by B from
KB = RB × (UA ×G− PKA)
= RB × ((RA + SKA)×G− PKA)
= RBRA ×G
= RA ×RB ×G
= KA
Therefore, we have the conclusion that Protocol IV-A provides key integrity under
the basic assumptions and the attack model that C has the basic ability. Similarly we
can prove that Protocol IV-B provides key integrity under the basic assumptions and the
attack model that C has the basic ability.
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Proposition 7.4 (Key confirmation of Protocol IV-A and IV-B). Assume there is an
attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay mes-
sages or delete messages transmitted via normal channel between A and B. After a com-
pleted run of Protocol IV-A (or IV-B), both A and B have received evidence confirming
that the other party knows the secret.
Proof. (1) A completed run of Protocol IV-A is defined by the equality of digestA and
digestB.
(2) digestA is computed by A and takes KA as part of the inputs. It is the evidence
confirming that A knows the secret.
(3) digestB is computed by B and takes KB as part of the inputs. It is the evidence
confirming that B knows the secret.
According to (1) and (2), after a completed run of Protocol IV-A, B has received evi-
dence confirming that A knows the secret; and according to (1) and (3), after a completed
run of Protocol IV-A, A has received evidence confirming that B knows the secret. There-
fore, we have the conclusion that Protocol IV-A provides key confirmation under the basic
assumptions and the attack model that C has the basic ability. Similarly we can prove
that Protocol IV-B provides key confirmation under the basic assumptions and the attack
model that C has the basic ability.
Proposition 7.5 (Known-key security (key freshness) of Protocol IV-A and IV-B). As-
sume there is an attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new
messages, delay messages or delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A
and B. In addition, C is able to obtain any previous session keys. After a completed run of
Protocol IV-A (or IV-B), C is unable to derive the shared secret from the previous session
keys.
Proof. In Protocol IV-A, the computation of the shared secret takes the RA and RB as
the inputs. Since RA and RB are random values generated by A and B respectively in the
key exchange procedure, in each run of Protocol IV-A the values are unique. Therefore,
the secret is fresh in each run of the protocol. That is, Protocol IV-A provides known-key
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security (key freshness) under the basic assumptions and the attack model that C has the
basic ability and the stronger ability 1. Similarly we can prove that Protocol IV-B provides
known-key security under the basic assumptions and the attack model that C has the basic
ability and the stronger ability 1.
Proposition 7.6 (Forward secrecy of Protocol IV-A and IV-B). Assume there is an attack-
er C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new messages, delay messages
or delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A and B. In addition, C
compromises the long-term secrets of A and B. C is unable to derive the previous session
keys.
Proof. (1) In Protocol V-A, C obtains the following information:
(E,G,Z∗q , A,B, PKA, PKB, UA, TB).
In addition, C compromises SKA and SKB.
(2) As we proved in Theorem 7.2, for a previous session of the protocol, RA or RB in
that session is required to compute the shared secret. According to (1), C does not obtain
RA or RB (which is short-term secret). Therefore, C is unable to compute the secret of
the previous run of the protocol.
According to (2), we have the conclusion that Protocol IV-A provides forward secrecy
under the basic assumptions and the attack model that C has the basic ability and the
stronger ability 2. Similarly we can prove that Protocol IV-B provides forward secrecy
under the basic assumptions and the attack model that C has the basic ability and the
stronger ability 2.
Proposition 7.7 (Resistance to combinatorial attacks of Protocol IV-A and IV-B). As-
sume there is an attacker C who can observe all messages, alter messages, insert new
messages, delay messages or delete messages transmitted via normal channels between A
and B. C is unable to break the short MAC outputs (i.e., the digests) through combinatorial
attacks.
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Proof. In Protocol IV-A, the value of digestA = disgestB is determined in step 1; the value
UA to compute digestA is kept secret until step 3; and the value TB to compute digestB
is kept secret until step 4. As a result, C is unable to break digestA = digestB through
combinatorial attacks before it is displayed in step 4. Therefore, we have the conclusion
that Protocol IV-A is resistant to combinatorial attacks. Similarly, we can prove that
Protocol IV-B is resistant to combinatorial attacks.
7.3.2 Resistance to Attacks
The low bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocols address the vulnerabilities to the
man-in-the-middle attack and the impersonation attack. Bellow we illustrate how these
attacks fail.
Resistance to the man-in-the-middle attack
Assume C is a man-in-the-middle attacker to Protocol IV-A between A and B. To launch
the attack, C interacts with A and B as follows.
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q and computes
UA = RA + SKA,
commitA = MAC(UA, A‖PKA).
Then A sends B M1 via a normal channel as follows:
A→ B : M1 = (A,PKA, commitA).
2. C firstly intercepts M1.
Secondly, C generates a random value RC ∈ Z∗q and computes
UC = RC + SKC ,
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commitCA = MAC(UC , A‖PKC).
At last, C sends a forged message (A,PKC , commitCA) to B, i.e.,
C → B : M ′1 = (A,PKC , commitC)
3. Upon receiving M ′1, B generates a random value RB ∈ Z∗q and computes
UB = RB + SKB,
TB = UB ×G,
commitB = MAC(TB, B‖PKB).
Then B sends A M2 via a normal channel as follows:
B → A : M2 = (B,PKB, commitB)
4. C firstly intercepts M2.
Secondly, C computes
TC = UC ×G,
commitCB = MAC(TC , B‖PKC).
Thirdly, C sends a forged message (B,PKC , commitCB) to A, i.e.,
C → A : M ′2 = (B,PKC , commitCB).
4. Upon receiving M ′2, A sends B M3 as follows:
A→ B : M3 = UA
132 Jie Zhang
5. C intercepts M3 and replaces UA with UC , i.e.,
C → B : M ′3 = UC
6. Upon receiving M ′3, B firstly verifies commitCA. The verification will succeed.
Second, B sends A with the following message
B → A : M4 = TB
Third, B computes the shared secret (with C) as follows
T ′A = UC ×G,
K ′B = RB × (T ′A − PKC) = RCRB ×G.
Finally, B computes a digest as follows and shows it on the display:
digestB = MAC16(K
′
Bx, A‖B‖PKC‖PKB‖UC‖TB).
7. C intercepts M4 and replace TB with TC , i.e.,
C → A : M ′4 = TC .
8. Upon receiving M ′4, A first verifies commitCB. The verification will succeed.
Second, A computes the shared secret (with C) as follows
K ′A = RA × (TC − PKC) = RCRA ×G.
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Finally, A computes a digest as follows and shows it on the display:
digestA = MAC16(K
′
Ax, A‖B‖PKA‖PKC‖UA‖TC).
However, digestA 6= digestB since K ′A 6= K ′B and A‖B‖PKA‖PKC‖UA‖TC 6=
A‖B‖PKC‖PKB‖UC‖TB. The attack fails at this stage.
Therefore, Protocol IV-A is resistent to the man-in-the-middle attack. Similarly, Protocol
IV-B is resistent to the man-in-the-middle attack.
Resistance to the impersonation attack
Assume C is an impersonation attacker to Protocol IV-A between A and B. To launch
the attack, C impersonates B and interacts with A as follows.
1. A generates a random value RA ∈ Z∗q and computes
UA = RA + SKA,
commitA = MAC(UA, A‖PKA)
Then A sends B M1 as follow:
A→ B : M1 = (A,PKA, commitA).
2. C firstly intercepts and blocks M1.
Secondly, C generates a random value RC ∈ Z∗q and computes
UC = RC + SKC ,
TC = UC ×G
commitCA = MAC(TC , B‖PKC)
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Thirdly, C sends A M ′2 as follows
C → A : M ′2 = (B,PKC , commitC).
3. Upon receiving M ′2, A sends B with the following message
A→ B : M3 = UA.
4. C firstly intercepts and blocks M2.
Secondly, C sends the following message to A.
C → A : M ′4 = TC
At this stage, C needs to computes a digest and shows it on B’s display. However,
C is unable to show a value on B’s display. The attack fails.
Therefore, Protocol IV-A is resistent to the impersonation attack. Similarly, Protocol IV-B
is resistent to the impersonation attack.
7.4 Performance
To study the performance of Protocol IV-A and Protocol IV-B, we choose the Bluetooth
Display protocol and the IEEE Display protocol as the benchmarks. We firstly theoretically
evaluate and compare the computational cost. Secondly, we realize prototypes of the
protocols and carry out two sets of experiment. The computational time is tested to
observe the computational cost.
7.4.1 Evaluation
Denote the cost of computing a scalar multiplication by S and the cost of computing or
verifying a MAC by H. The computational cost is evaluated in Table 7.1. According to
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Table 7.1: Evaluation of computational costs of Protocol IV-A, IV-B, the Bluetooth Display
protocol and the IEEE Display protocol.
Computation Cost Cost on A Cost on B
Protocol IV-A 3H+ S 3H+ 3S
Protocol IV-B 3H+ 3S 3H+ S
Bluetooth Display 2H+ 2S 2H+ 2S
IEEE Display 3H+ 2S 3H+ 2S
Table 7.1 we have the following conclusions:
• Conclusion 1: Protocol IV-A reduces the computational cost on A compared with
the Bluetooth Display protocol and the IEEE Display protocol;
• Conclusion 2: Protocol IV-B reduces the computational cost on B compared with
the Bluetooth Display protocol and the IEEE Display protocol;
• Conclusion 3: When A is a computationally limited device and B is much powerful
than A, the overall performance of Protocol IV-A is better than that of the Blue-
tooth Display protocol and the IEEE Display protocol since it let the powerful side
undertake computational tasks on behalf of the limited one. Similarly, when B is a
limited device and A is a powerful one, the overall performance of Protocol IV-B is
better than that of the Bluetooth Display protocol and the IEEE Display protocol.
7.4.2 Experiments
We realize prototypes of Protocol IV-A, IV-B, the Bluetooth Display protocol and the
IEEE Display protocol using Python programming language. The MAC algorithm is
realized through HMAC with SHA-256. The communication is realized through socket
programming with TCP. Two sets of experiment are carried out. In Experiment IV-1, in
order to observe how much computational cost that Protocol IV-A and IV-B reduce on the
initiator and the responder respectively, we use two virtual machines with the same con-
figuration to execute the protocols. In Experiment IV-2, in order to simulate two parties
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Table 7.2: Experimental environment of Experiment IV-1.
Party Operating System Base Memory Storage
A Ubuntu 16.04.3 (32-bit) 1024 MB 10 GB
B Ubuntu 16.04.3 (32-bit) 1024 MB 10 GB
Figure 7.3: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol IV-A in Experiment IV-1.
with different computational powers, we use a Raspberry Pi and a laptop to execute the
protocols.
Experiment IV-1
The initiator A and the responder B are deployed on two virtual machines with the same
configuration (Table 7.2). We firstly run Protocol IV-A and IV-B with five elliptic curves
P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 for ten times. The average computational time is
illustrated in Figure 7.3 and 7.4. Secondly, we run IV-A, IV-B, Bluetooth Display and
IEEE Display with the elliptic curve P-256 for ten times. The average computational time
is illustrated in Figure 7.5.
Figure 7.3 and 7.4 show that for all of the five curves, Protocol IV-A has less computa-
tional time on A than on B; and Protocol IV-B has less computational time on B than on
Chapter 7. Low Bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE Protocols 137
Figure 7.4: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol IV-B in Experiment IV-1.
Figure 7.5: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol IV-A, IV-B, Bluetooth
Display and IEEE Display in Experiment IV-1.
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Table 7.3: Experimental environment of Experiment IV-2.
Experimental Device CPU Memory Hard Disk
Raspberry Pi 1.2 GMHz ARM 1 GB 32 GB
laptop 2.40 GHz i5-6200U 4 GB 120 GB
A. According to Figure 7.5, the average computational time on A of Protocol IV-A is less
than that of the Bluetooth Display protocol and the IEEE Display protocol; and the aver-
age computational time on B of Protocol IV-B is less than that of the Bluetooth Display
protocol and the IEEE Display protocol. It is corresponding to the first two conclusions
in Section 7.4.1.
Experiment IV-2
In Experiment IV-2, we use a Raspberry Pi as the computationally limited device, and a
laptop as its powerful communicating partner. For Protocol IV-A, we deploy the initiator
A on the Raspberry Pi and the responder B on the laptop. For Protocol IV-B, we deploy
the initiator A on the laptop and the responder B on the Raspberry Pi. Details about the
Raspberry Pi and the laptop are listed in Table 7.3.
We run Protocol IV-A, IV-B, the Bluetooth Display protocol and the IEEE Display
protocol with the elliptic curve P-256 for ten times. The average computational time is
illustrated in Figure 7.6.
According to Figure 7.6, Protocol IV-A and IV-B are more friendly to the limited
device (Raspberry Pi); and the overall computational time of Protocol IV-A and IV-B
are less than that of the Bluetooth Display protocol and the IEEE Display protocol. The
experimental results are corresponding to the third conclusion in Section 7.4.1.
7.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented two low bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocols. The two
protocols remove attacks to UECDH through the commitment mechanism and comparing
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Figure 7.6: Average computational time on A and B of Protocol IV-A, IV-B, the Bluetooth
Display protocol and the IEEE Display protocol in Experiment IV-2.
digests via low bandwidth OOB channel, i.e., the displays. The security of the protocols
was analyzed; and the resistance to the man-in-the-middle attack and the impersonation
attack was analyzed. To observe the performance of the two protocols, the display as-
sociation protocol in IEEE 802.15.6 and the numeric comparison protocol in Bluetooth
5.0 were set as the benchmarks. The prototypes of the two protocols and the benchmark
protocols were realized. The performance was studied and compared both through theo-
retical evaluation and two sets of experiments. The results show that the low bandwidth
UECDH-based AKE protocols reduce the computational time on the computationally lim-
ited device; and have better overall performance than the benchmarks. They are more
suitable than the benchmark protocols in securing communications between two devices
with different computational capabilities.
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we studied AKE protocols with unbalanced computational requirements. In
particular, we proposed UECDH key exchange scheme by transferring one scalar multipli-
cation from one party to its communicating partner in the ECDH key exchange scheme;
and utilizing different authentication measures, we presented four sets of UECDH-based
AKE schemes that are suitable for a variety of use cases. Similar protocols from interna-
tional standards including IEEE 802.15.6, TLS and Bluetooth were set as benchmarks. We
realized prototypes for the proposed protocols and benchmark protocols. Performance of
these protocols was evaluated and tested in terms of computational time. The experimental
results show that the proposed protocols have better performance than the benchmark pro-
tocols. This chapter gives a brief review for the four sets of UECDH-based AKE protocols
and presents the future work.
8.1 Conclusion
The four sets of UECDH-based AKE protocol are concluded as follows. In addition, we also
compare them in Table 8.1 in terms of the authentication measure, benchmark, advantage
and limitation.
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8.1.1 Password UECDH-based AKE Protocols
Passwords are short secrets that are easily remembered by humans. Therefore, instead
of being securely stored in the device, they can be input by the human users during the
run of a protocol. AKE protocols using passwords have been widely studied. The IEEE
Standard 802.15.6 also includes a password authenticated association protocol. In this
thesis, we proposed two password UECDH-based AKE protocols: Protocol I-A and I-B.
The password in the protocols is used for both authentication and hiding the public key
(of the party undertaking more computations).
The advantage of password UECDH-based AKE protocols is the lower storage cost on
both parties. The limitation is the unsuitability for one-to-many communicating scenarios.
When the party undertaking more computations needs to execute the protocol with more
than one parties, the public key will be stored by more parties and no longer kept hidden.
This may lead to security vulnerabilities.
8.1.2 Public Key Authenticated UECDH-based AKE Protocols
In practice, communicating parties can acquire authenticated public key of each other
through the PKI. In the PKI, there is a CA issuing public key certificates for the parties.
The PKI-based measure is a more conventional and widely used way to exchange public
keys for secure handshakes. For example, the most widely used security scheme, TLS,
involves several AKE protocols that are based on PKI. In this thesis, we proposed two
public key authenticated UECDH-based AKE protocols: Protocol II-A and II-B. The
protocols assume both parties have the authenticated public key of each other through
PKI prior to the key exchange procedure. In addition, the digital signature algorithm is
used to guarantee authentication.
The public key authenticated UECDH-based AKE protocols do not require hiding the
public keys. Therefore, compared with Protocol I-A and I-B, the advantage is that they
remove security vulnerabilities in one-to-many communicating scenarios. However, issuing
and maintaining the public key certificates are complicated and expensive.
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8.1.3 High Bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE Protocols
The OOB channels are resistant to a number of attacks; therefore, they are often used to
transmit authenticated messages in security protocols. Both the Bluetooth Specification
and the IEEE Standard 802.15.6 include AKE protocols that use OOB channels. In this
thesis, we designed two UECDH-based AKE protocols that use high bandwidth OOB
channels: Protocol III-A and Protocol III-B. The protocols transmit the public keys and
core values to compute the shared secret through OOB channels. As a result, the man-in-
the-middle attacks and impersonation attacks to the protocols fail.
The advantage of high bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocols is that they do
not rely on any pre-shared secret or any trusted third party. Therefore, they are much
useful in pervasive computing and communication where the parties are unacquainted with
each other. The limitation is that they require the communicating parties can establish
high bandwidth OOB channels between them.
8.1.4 Low Bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE Protocols
Low bandwidth OOB channels, such as Display OOB channels, are easily to establish
between two devices that both of them have a display for five-digit hash output. There-
fore, to resist combinatorial attacks to short hash strings, commitment mechanisms are
applied. Low bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocols are also included in the
Bluetooth Specification and the IEEE Standard 802.15.6. In this thesis, we presented
two low bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocols: Protocol IV-A and IV-B. To
guarantee authentication, the two protocols use the displays to compare digests.
Similarly with the high bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocols, the advantage
of low bandwidth OOB UECDH-based AKE protocols is removing reliance on pre-shared
secrets or trusted third parties. The limitation is that they require both communicating
devices have a display for five-digit number.
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8.2 Future Work
8.2.1 Formal Verification of Protocols
Formal verification of security protocols is a highly active topic in the research community.
It proves the correctness of protocols and avoids faults in designing security protocols. A
number of formal methods and automatic tools have been developed by now, such as the
Failures Divergences Refinement (FDR) [39, 38] which is a model checker for the process
algebra Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [49], Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN)
logic [19], Gong-Needham-Yahalom (GNY) logic [44] and so on.
Available formal methods cannot verify security protocols using OOB channels; and
they are unavailable to verify some new features of security protocols such as the unbal-
anced computations. Therefore, it is valuable to extend current formal methods and the
automatic tools.
8.2.2 Unbalancing Other AKE Protocols
In addition to the ECDH key exchange scheme, it is also valuable to unbalance com-
putations in the identity (ID)-based AKE schemes. The ID-based cryptography is first
introduced by Sharmir [91]. It guarantees authenticity by linking the public keys to the
entities identities; therefore, secure communication can be established without a pre-shared
secret or a PKI.
Since Boneh and Franklin [17] introduced the first ID-based encryption scheme from
bilinear pairings, a number of ID-based AKE protocols [96, 95, 27, 104, 47] from bilinear
pairings are proposed. The majority of available ID-based AKE protocols require the
two parties execute equivalent bilinear pairing computation which is a time-consuming
operation [25]. Therefore, transferring the bilinear parings from the limited party to the
powerful one will significantly improve the overall performance of ID-based AKE protocols.
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8.2.3 Applications
The AKE protocols with unbalanced computational requirements are suitable for a variety
of applications. An emerging application in recent years is the blockchain-based IoT data
management. Blockchain is an innovative technique for distributed computing introduced
by the cryptographic currency bitcoin. It is anticipated to have enormous potential to
manage numerous distributed data in IoT.
Currently, the security of blockchain-based IoT data management relies on TLS. How-
ever, devices in IoT have fairly different computational capabilities; and communications
in IoT often take place between a limited end device and a more powerful gateway or serv-
er. Therefore, it is valuable to replace the TLS handshake protocols with the unbalanced
AKE protocols. A meaningful future work is designing a more suitable security layer for
blockchain-based IoT data management.
Appendix A
List of Acronyms
AKE Authenticated Key Exchange
BAN BurrowsCAbadiCNeedham
CA Certificate Authority
CSP Communicating Sequential Processes
DH Diffie-Hellman
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDHP Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem
ECDLP Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FDR Failures Divergences Refinement
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GNY Gong-Needham-Yahalom
HMAC Hash-Based Message Authentication Code
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ID Identity
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IOS International Organization for Standardization
IoT Internet of Things
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OOB Out of Band
PK Public Key
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PW Password
QR Quick Response
RSA RivestCShamirCAdleman
S/MIME Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
UECDH Unbalanced Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
WBAN Wireless Body Area Network
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